Mowing Down a Grass Roots Movement But Protecting the Crabgrass: Congressional Term Limits Are Unconstitutional by Connolly, Lincoln J.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
4-1-1996
Mowing Down a Grass Roots Movement But
Protecting the Crabgrass: Congressional Term
Limits Are Unconstitutional
Lincoln J. Connolly
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lincoln J. Connolly, Mowing Down a Grass Roots Movement But Protecting the Crabgrass: Congressional Term Limits Are Unconstitutional,
50 U. Miami L. Rev. 661 (1996)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol50/iss3/12
CASENOTE
Mowing Down a Grass Roots Movement But
Protecting the Crabgrass: Congressional
Term Limits Are Unconstitutional
1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 661
11. PERSPECTIVE ............................................................ 664
A. History of Congressional Term Limits in America ......................... 664
I. THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS ........................................ 664
2. THE CREATION OF THE CONSTITUTION ................................. 665
a. The Constitutional Convention ................................... 665
b. The Ratification Process ........................................ 666
3. TERM LIMITS IN CONGRESS .......................................... 667
B. Congressional Term Limits in America Today ............................ 669
III. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS ..................................................... 670
A. Powell v. McCormack ...... ................................... 671
B. Cases Involving Issues of Federalism ................................... 672
C. Elections Cases ...................................................... 674
IV. ANALYSIS OF US TERM LIMrs, INc. v. THoRNT-oN ................................ 678
A. The Majority Opinion ................................................ 678
1. POWELL V. MCCORMACK REVISITED ................................... 678
2. STATE POWER TO ESTABLISH QUALIFICATIONS ............................... 681
3. PERMISSIBLE BALLOT ACCESS REGULATION OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL
QUALIFICATION? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  684
B. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence ........................................ 687
C. Justice Thomas' Dissent .............................................. 689
1. RESERVATION OF POWERS BY THE STATES ................................... 690
2. THE QUALIFICATIONS CLAUSES ....................................... 696
3. THE ULTIMATE SAVIOR OF AMENDMENT 73 ............................ 701
V . COMMENTS ............................................................. 702
A. The Strength and Vitality of U.S. Term Limits ........................... 702
B. Constitutional, Political, and Practical Implications of U.S. Term Limits on the
Term Limits M ovement ............................................... 703
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 3, 1992, Arkansas voters approved an amendment to
the Arkansas Constitution that limited their U.S. representatives having
served more than three terms and their U.S. senators having served more
than two terms from ever again obtaining ballot access for the same
office.I The fate of the measure, Amendment 73, was quickly thrust into
1. Amendment 73 reads, in pertinent part:
Preamble: The people of Arkansas find and declare that elected officials who
remain in office too long become preoccupied with reelection and ignore their duties
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the hands of the judiciary when a lawsuit was filed just ten days after the
election.2 Two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court heard the case,3 and
settled debate over a political principle as old as the republic itself:
Congressional term limits are unconstitutional.'
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton5 began in Circuit Court in
Pulaski County, Arkansas.6 The Arkansas League of Women Voters
and Bobbie Hill7 sued the State Board of Election Commissioners,
Arkansas' incumbent U.S. senators and representatives, incumbent state
legislators and constitutional officers, and Arkansas' Republican and
Democratic parties.8 The plaintiffs alleged that Amendment 73 violated
the Qualifications Clauses of the U.S. Constitution 9 by imposing a quali-
as representatives of the people. Entrenched incumbency has reduced voter
participation and has led to an electoral system that is less free, less competitive, and
less representative than the system established by the Founding Fathers. Therefore,
the people of Arkansas, exercising their reserved powers, herein limit the terms of
elected officials.
§ 3 Congressional Delegation.
(a) Any person having been elected to three or more terms as a member of the
United States House of Representatives from Arkansas shall not be certified as a
candidate and shall not be eligible to have his/her name placed on the ballot for
election to the United States House of Representatives from Arkansas.
(b) Any person having been elected to two or more terms as a member of the
United States Senate from Arkansas shall not be certified as a candidate and shall
not be eligible to have his/her name placed on the ballot for election to the United
States Senate from Arkansas.
ARK. CONST. amend. 73.
The measure also imposed term limitations, as opposed to ballot access limitations, on vari-
ous state officeholders. Id. amend. 73, §§ 1-2. Those limits were challenged unsuccessfully at the
state trial and supreme court level. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349 (Ark. 1994)
(Hill); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1846 n.1 (1995) (U.S. Term Limits).
Additionally, the case presented state constitutional law issues neither considered by the U.S.
Supreme Court nor discussed here. Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 354-55, 357-59, 360-61; see also U.S.
Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1846 n.l.
2. Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 352.
3. Id. at 349, cert. granted sub nom. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 114 S. Ct. 2703
(1994).
4. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1842.
5. Id.
6. Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 352.
7. Hill alleged she was a political supporter of John Dawson, a member of the Arkansas
House of Representatives, who had served seven prior terms there. Id. at 353.
8. Id.
9. The Qualifications Clauses provide: "No Person shall be a Representative who shall not
have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and have been seven Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be
chosen;" U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2. "No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained
to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not,
when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen." Id. § 3, cl. 3.
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fication not contained therein for these two federal offices.' 0 The State
of Arkansas and other organizations supporting the measure, including
U.S. Term Limits, Inc., intervened as defendants."' The complaint was
then amended to name as a plaintiff Dick Herget, a supporter of U.S.
Representative Ray Thornton of Arkansas.12
On cross-motions for summary judgment,1 3 the trial judge granted
declaratory relief, invalidating Amendment 73.14 The Arkansas
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ballot access limits for mem-
bers of Congress violated the Qualifications Clauses. 5 The State of
Arkansas and other defendants then successfully petitioned the U.S.
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. 6 On May 22, 1995, the Court
affirmed, holding Arkansas' congressional ballot access limits unconsti-
tutional. U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
10. Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 352. The plaintiffs also alleged that § 3 was not severable and that its
unconstitutionality thus voided the entire amendment. They also claimed that the absence of an
enacting clause in Amendment 73 violated Amendment 7 of the state constitution. Id. at 352-53.
The plaintiffs also asserted that Amendment 73 was unconstitutional under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Brief for the State Petitioner at 4, U.S. Term
Limits (Nos. 93-1456 and 93-1828). The Pulaski County Circuit Court held that Amendment 73
did not offend either amendment. Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 359. The Arkansas Supreme Court
addressed the First and Fourteenth Amendment issues only with regard to term limits for state
officeholders, and affirmed the Circuit Court's decision on this point. Id.
11. Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 353. The other intervenors were Americans for Term Limits and
Arkansans for Governmental Reform. Id.
12. Id. Thornton had served three previous terms in the U.S. House of Representatives. id.
13. As summarized by the Arkansas Supreme Court:
Appellees Hill and Herget joined by U.S. Congressman Ray Thornton and the
State Democratic Party moved for summary judgment to void Amendment 73 in
accordance with the Amended Complaint. [Several unified state legislators] filed a
similar motion. The State of Arkansas and Arkansans for Governmental Reform
moved to Dismiss the complaint for lack of justiciability. Intervenor U.S. Term
Limits moved for summary judgment on grounds that Amendment 73 was valid in
all respects.
Id.
14. Id. The trial judge based his decision primarily on the absence of an enacting clause
within Amendment 73. Id. In addition, the court held that § 3 violated the Qualifications Clauses
of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
15. Id. at 349. The Hill court was terribly fractured, with no majority opinion. Three justices
formed a plurality, and two more concurred in part and dissented in part. These five held that
Amendment 73's congressional ballot access provisions were unconstitutional. Id. at 351-61
(plurality opinion of Robert Brown, J.), 361-63 (Gerald Brown, Special J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), 363-66 (Dudley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Two more
justicies separately concurred in part and dissented in part, concluding that the ballot access
provisions were constitutional. Id. at 367-68 (Hays, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
368-70 (George K. Cracraft, Special C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). All
references in this Note to Hill are to the plurality opinion, unless otherwise specified.
Four of the Arkansas Supreme Court justices did not participate in the decision, id. at 361,
recusing themselves without explanation. David Heckelman, 3 Justices Should Have Recused on
Term Limits: Quinn, CHI. DAILY L. BuLL., Sept. 8, 1994, at 1.
16. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 114 S. Ct. 2703 (1994).
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This Note analyzes the history of and debate over congressional
term limits and, more specifically, the provision at issue in U.S. Term
Limits. Part II chronicles the congressional term limits movement, from
revolutionary America through the establishment of our current system
of government, concluding with its current status. Part III examines the
legal foundations of congressional term limits, focusing primarily on
cases to which the Supreme Court attached significance in deciding U.S.
Term Limits. Parts IV and V analyze and critique U.S. Term Limits and
offer a short commentary on the future of the term limits movement in
light of this decision.
II. PERSPECTIVE
While term limits may appear to most people to be a recent political
phenomenon, they are, in fact, not new to America or even democratic
government. Historically known as "rotation in office,"' 7 term limits
were first established in Greece'" and Rome.' 9 More importantly, how-
ever, they were embraced by America's first national government.
A. History of Congressional Term Limits in America
1. THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
The Articles of Confederation limited members of the Continental
Congress to serving only three years in the space of any six.20 By 1784,
three years after the Articles were implemented, several delegates had
exceeded their allowed terms, although not all were forced from office.2'
In this first American government, the states voluntarily ceded a
limited amount of sovereignty,22 whereas the people directly granted
17. JAMES K. COYNE & JOHN H. FUND, CLEANING HOUSE: AMERICA'S CAMPAIGN FOR TERM
LIMITS 110 (1992).
18. Id. (citing Mark Petracca, Rotation in Office: The History of an Idea (paper prepared for
a conference at the Rockefeller Institute of Government at SUNY-Albany, Oct. 1991)).
19. Robert Struble, Jr. & Z.W. Jahre, Rotation in Office: Rapid but Restricted to the House,
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICS, 37 n.7 (Mar. 1991).
20. ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. V, cl. 2. Although passed in 1777, this provision did not
become effective until 1781 when the Articles were finally ratified. JACK N. RAKOVE, THE
BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
218 (1979).
21. Massachusetts' Samuel Osgood was forced to resign under protest. EDMUND C.
BURNETT, THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 605 (1941). Two members from Delaware were expelled
for violating the provision. Id. Two members of the Rhode Island delegation were also
challenged for violating the provision, and their objections led to vociferous debate. Id. at 605-06.
James Monroe remarked, "I never saw more indecent conduct in any assembly before." Id. at
606. Ironically, the Rhode Islanders were allowed to remain because the Congress needed their
presence to conduct business. Id.
22. Under the Articles of Confederation, the states were guaranteed their sovereignty and the
Continental Congress had no power to force the states to obey its resolutions. ARTS. OF
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power to create our present federal government.23 Although term limita-
tions were included in the Articles of Confederation,24 the states were
sharply divided on the idea of rotation of office.25 It had "worked very
badly" 26 in the Continental Congress by forcing some men from office,
such as James Madison, just when their talents were emerging.27
Although this was not the reason the states sent delegates to Philadelphia
to reform the Articles,28 term limits were excluded from the renowned
product of their efforts, the Constitution.
2. THE CREATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
a. The Constitutional Convention
Rotation of office was included in, but quickly removed from, the
Constitutional Convention's first working paper, the Virginia Plan.29
The second draft of the Constitution retained this omission,3 0 and appar-
ently no one ever formally suggested any further form of congressional
term limitation. The final version of the Constitution did not include
CONFEDERATION art. II; CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 48-52 (1987); see
also U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1855 (Under the Articles of Confederation. "the States
retained most of their sovereignty, like independent nations bound together only by treaties.")
(citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 9 (1964)).
23. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403-04 (1819):
The government proceeds directly from the people; is "ordained and established" in
the name of the people; and is declared to be ordained, "in order to form a more
perfect union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, and secure the
blessings of liberty to themselves and to their posterity." The assent of the States, in
their sovereign capacity, is implied in calling a Convention, and thus submitting that
instrument to the people. But the people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it;
and their act was final. It required not the affirmance, and could not be negatived,
by the State governments. The constitution, when thus adopted. was of complete
obligation, and bound the State sovereignties.
24. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
25. CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 613 (1928).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. The Philadelphia assembly was called to reform the Articles of Confederation by
strengthening the Continental Congress, although Madison and some others intended to construct
a new government entirely. See, e.g., ROssITER, supra note 22, at 169.
29. 1 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 143-44, 153 (Jonathan
Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]. Offered by Edmund Randolph on May
29, 1787, the Virginia Plan provided that members of what became the House of Representatives
would be "incapable of reelection for the space of after the expiration of their term of service
. ... " Iid. at 143-44 (space intentionally left blank). However, on May 31, that provision and
others were removed as being "too ... detail[ed] for general propositions." 5 id. at 137. The
motion carried unanimously without any record of debate. Neil Gorsuch & Michael Guzman, Will
the Gentlemen Please Yield? A Defense of The Constitutionality Of State-Imposed Term
Limitations, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 341, 347 (1991); see also U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1859
n.22 (noting no record of debate on either the proposal or its excision).
30. 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 376-81.
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any term limit provision, even though thirty-two of its thirty-nine signa-
tories had served in the Continental Congress and were presumably
aware of the Articles' rotation of office scheme."
b. The Ratification Process
Rotation in office received more attention in the battle over ratifica-
tion than in the convention. Some Anti-Federalists32 opposed the Con-
stitution partly because of the exclusion of term limits. They feared that
members of Congress would perpetually be reelected and lose touch
with the people.3 3 William Findley railed against the Constitution, con-
cluding that "[flotation, that noble prerogative of liberty, is entirely
excluded from the new system of government, and the great men may
and probably will be continued in office during their lives."34
At least three state ratifying conventions requested that some form
of congressional rotation of office be included in the Constitution. New
York proposed limiting senators to six years of service within any
twelve.3 5 Virginia and North Carolina both suggested a rotation princi-
ple be endorsed in a constitutional amendment.36
Conversely, Robert R. Livingston argued at the New York ratifying
convention that
rotation is an absurd species of ostracism-a mode of proscribing
eminent merit, and banishing from stations of trust those who have
filled them with the greatest faithfulness. . . . The acquisition of abil-
ities is hardly worth the trouble, unless one is to enjoy the satisfaction
of employing them for the good of one's country. We all know that
experience is indispensably necessary to good government. Shall we,
then, drive experience into obscurity.?37
The authors of the Federalist Papers responded to the Anti-Federal-
ists' cries by arguing that the regular, biennial elections imposed upon
the House of Representatives accomplished the same end38 by ensuring
31. AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, LIMITING PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL TERMS 6
(1979).
32. Those in favor of ratification called themselves Federalists while their opponents were
known as Anti-Federalists. See, e.g., ROSSITER, supra note 22, at 278-79.
33. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 286-91.
34. William Findley, Letter of an Officer of the Late Continental Army, Nov. 3, 1787, in
ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 135 (John D. Lewis ed., 1967).
35. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES 330.
36. 3 id. at 657-58 and 4 id. at 243, respectively.
37. 2 id. 293.
38. Of course, neither frequency nor popular election were available in the Senate, where
members originally were selected by their respective state legislatures for six-year terms. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2. Madison argued this structure was necessary to prevent "an
unenlightened and variable policy," and "particular moments in public affairs when the people,
stimulated by some irregular passion or some illicit advantage ... may call for measures which
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a close bond between citizens and their legislators.
As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should
have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential
that the [House of Representatives] should have an immediate depen-
dence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elec-
tions are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence
and sympathy can be effectually secured.3 9
As with their other complaints about the Constitution, the Anti-
Federalists saw their grievances about the absence of rotation provisions
slighted when states ratified the Constitution as proposed. Although
some state ratifying conventions proposed term limits amendments,
none of the twelve amendments approved by the first Congress and put
before the states for ratification included any mandate of rotation of
office.40
3. TERM LIMITS IN CONGRESS
The push for rotation of office continued into the first Congress. In
1789, Representative Thomas Tucker of South Carolina proposed limits
on both House and Senate terms. 4 1 Since that time, term limits propo-
nents have sporadically introduced such bills, with a flurry thereof in
recent decades.42 House members apparently proposed Senate rotation
requirements in 1896, 1904, and 1906.43 The first floor vote on congres-
sional term limits came in 1947 while Congress was debating the presi-
dential term limit that became the Twenty-Second Amendment. Senator
W. Lee O'Daniel of Texas proposed a single six-year term for the Presi-
dent, Vice-President, and both houses of Congress. His proposal was
they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn." THE FEDERALIST No.
63, at 382, 384 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). He also argued corruption of the
Senate was implausible because the House, state legislatures, and the people vicariously
transmitting their will through both would provide a check on the Senate. Id. at 387-88. The
Federalist papers ignored the issue of congressional rotation of office. Troy A. Eid & Jim Kolbe,
The New Anti-Fedederalism: The Constitutionality of State-Imposed Limits on Congressional
Terms of Office, 69 DENV. U. L. Rav. 1, 17 (1992).
39. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 327 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis
added). Recognizing the flip-side, Madison conceded that "[a] few of the members, as happens in
all such assemblies, will possess superior talents; will, by frequent re-elections, become members
of long standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps, not unwilling to
avail themselves of those advantages." Id. No. 53, at 335.
40. Eid & Kolbe, supra note 38, at 22.
41. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 761 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). The House never voted on Tucker's
proposal. SULA P. RICHARDSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE No. 89-537
CONGRESSIONAL TENURE: A REVIEW OF EFFORTS TO LIMIT HOUSE AND SENATE SERVICE 4 (1989).
42. More than 75% of these proposals have been submitted since 1970. AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, supra note 31, at 9.
43. RICHARDSON, supra note 41, at 4 n.12. These proposals are not well documented and
confusion exists as to their exact nature. Id. None of these proposals were voted upon. Id. at 4.
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defeated 82 to 1." House and Senate members have introduced numer-
ous term limits in every Congress since 1975, reaching previous highs of
twelve in the 95th45 and 103rd4 6 Congresses. Before 1995, none were
given serious consideration. 7
Following the 1994 elections, prospects for congressional action on
term limits appeared better than ever. As a part of their "Contract with
America," more than 300 Republican candidates for the House of Repre-
sentatives declared their intent to vote on congressional term limits in
the first 100 days of the 104th Congress.48 When the Republicans
gained control of Congress,49 hopes were high for passage of an amend-
ment .5  Those hopes proved futile.
At least 25 bills or constitutional amendment proposals have been
filed in the House during the 104th Congress.' One garnered a major-
44. 93 CONG. REC. 1962-63 (1947); see also GEORGE F. WILL, RESTORATION: CONGRESS,
TERM LIMITS, AND THE RECOVERY OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 187-89 (1992).
45. RICHARDSON, supra note 41, at 7.
46. S.J. Res. 12, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S.J. Res. 18, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S.J.
Res. 33, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S.J. Res. 34, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 31,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 71, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 77, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 164, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 203, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 221, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 298, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 339, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). Author search of LEXIS,
Legislation Library, Bills File.
47. JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 73-74
(1992). None of the twelve term limits bills introduced in the 103rd Congress were debated, even
in subcommittee. Kevin Merida, Term Limit Proposal Likely Faces an Uphill Fight, THE BERGEN
REc., Jan. 3, 1995, at A 1l. In 1994, Senator Hank Brown offered a term limit amendment to a bill
to reform congressional campaign financing. His amendment was defeated by a vote of 57 to 39.
Id.
48. David Hess, GOP Candidates Sign 'Contract' of Promises, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 28,
1994, at 7A. In addition, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. asked 1994 congressional candidates to sign two
pledges: one to vote for a congressional term limit constitutional amendment; and a second to
oppose any effort to alter state-enacted congressional term limit laws. Of those elected Who had
signed these pledges, six violated the first, and 61 broke the latter, voting for a bill which would
have imposed a 12-year limitation on House service, longer than most states enacted. 104th
Congress: 1994 Pledge Breakers, Dec. 12, 1995, available on Congressional and State Term
Limits Homepage of the Internet, at http://www.termlimits.org/violators l04.shtm.
49. Evan Thomas & Rich Thomas, A Guide to the First 100 Days, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 9, 1995,
at 21.
50. Jonathan Alter, Decoding the Contract, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 9, 1995, at 26, However, only
Republican House candidates signed the contract, not Senate candidates. And the contract only
promised a vote, not passage of its proposals. David Hess, GOP's Contract Faces Reality Check
by Edgy Lawmakers, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 4, 1994, at 13A. Some representatives wavered early.
Congressman Dick Armey hinted that Republicans might back away from their promise because
with Republicans controlling Congress, the public might no longer want congressional term limits.
GOP Suddenly Not So Keen on Term Limits, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 22, 1994, at 7A. House
Republicans were divided on whether the House limits should be three or six terms. Steve Daley,
With Mixed Feelings, GOP Tackles Term Limits, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 15, 1995, at 8.
51. H.R. 850, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 1104, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.J.
Res. 2, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 3, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 8,
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ity,52 but not the required two-thirds approval." Senators filed six pro-
posals, 54 but in October 1995 tabled the one bill that reached the floor
for reconsideration this spring. 5  Senators even defeated a nonbinding
"sense of the Senate" resolution pledging to enact term limits.5 6
B. Congressional Term Limits in America Today
Citizens in twenty-one states have imposed term or ballot access
limits on their congressional delegations through voter initiatives and
two state legislatures have done so on their own. 7 Colorado was first in
1990, limiting its U.S. senators and representatives to twelve consecu-
tive years in office.5 In 1991, Washington voters became the first to
reject congressional term limits by voting down a proposal to, in part,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 12, 104th
Cong., 1st Ses. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 24, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 25, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 29, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 34, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 38, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 39, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995); H.R.J. Res. 44, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 52, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995); H.R.J. Res. 65, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 66, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995); H.R.J. Res. 73, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 75, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995); H.R.J. Res. 76, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 77, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.,
(1995); H.R.J. Res. 82, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R.J. Res. 91, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995); H.R.J., Res. 92, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Author search of LEXIS, Legislation
Library, Bills file. Two bills brought up for a vote "became four competing bills on the House
floor-a sign that the leadership wanted lots of political cover by [sic] nothing to pass." Paul
Jacob's August 1995 Message, Dec. 12, 1995, available on Congressional & State Term Limits
Homepage of the Internet, at http://www.temlimits.org/jacobsmess.shtml.
52. Senate Rejects Proposal To Endorse Term Limits, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1995, at A20.
The March 1995 House vote was more than 60 votes short of the two-thirds required for passage.
Id.
53. See U.S. CONST. art. V (two-thirds vote required in both houses of Congress to submit
constitutional amendments to the states for ratification).
54. S. 271, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 272, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 683, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S.J. Res. 19, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S.J. Res. 21, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995); S.J. Res. 36, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
55. Senate Rejects Proposal, supra note 52. The proposal was at least 20 votes short of two-
thirds at the time. Id.
56. Id. This proposal was rejected by a vote of 49 to 45. Id. However, 62% of those
Senators up for re-election in 1996 voted in its favor. TL Sense of Senate Fails, Dec. 12, 1995,
available on Congressional and State Term Limits Homepage of the Internet, at http://
www.termlimits.org/sensense95.shtml.
57. Grover G. Norquist, A Limited Future, THE AMERICAN SPECTATOR, Aug. 1995, available
in LEXIS, News Library, MAGS file. The breadth of the U.S. Term Limits holding certainly
invalidates all of these term limitations. See U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1909 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
In addition, the South Dakota and Utah state legislatures have petitioned Congress for a
constitutional convention to propose a term limit amendment, pursuant to Article V of the U.S.
Constitution. H.R.J. Res. 1001, 64th Sess., 1989 S.D. Laws; S.J. Res. 24, 48th Sess. 1990 Utah
Laws; see also U.S. CONST. art. V ("[O]n the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
several States, [Congress] shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments . .
58. COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 9a(l).
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limit their representatives to three consecutive terms and their senators
to two consecutive terms.59 One year later, however, Washington's citi-
zens approved an initiative that placed ballot access limits, instead of the
earlier, rejected term limits, on its congressional delegation. 60  That
same day, Arkansas voters passed proposed Constitutional Amendment
4,6! resulting in the litigation forming the basis of this Note.
III. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
The U.S. Supreme Court did not have occasion until U.S. Term
Limits to decide whether congressional term or ballot access limits were
constitutional. The Court, however, had previously considered several
of the key issues in U.S. Term Limits, including the concept of federal-
ism and various impediments to the ballot or elected office.62 In addi-
tion, one lower federal court and several state panels had previously
examined term or ballot access limitations on congressional and state
candidates under both state and the federal constitutions. 63
Since proposals for congressional term limits began gaining
momentum earlier this decade, speculation ran high on the constitutional
and legal theories the Court would use to determine their fate.64 Surpris-
ingly, the majority in U.S. Term Limits opted to base its decision invali-
dating Arkansas' Amendment 73 not on the weight of judicial authority
as many expected, but instead almost exclusively on historical authority.
59. Timothy Egan, State of Washington Rejects A Plan to Curb Incumbents, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 7, 1991, at B16. The proposal was rejected by a vote of 54% to 46%. Id. In 1994, Utah
voters rejected a congressional term limit proposal to modify limits previously passed by their
state legislature. Tony Semerad, Term Limits Aren't Dead, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Nov. 10, 1994,
available in LEXIS, News Library, SLTRIB file.
60. WASti. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 29.68.015-.016 (West Supp. 1994). Those affected would be
House members having served six years in any 12 and Senators having served 12 years in any 18.
Id.
61. The vote tally was 494,326 in favor, 330,836 opposed. Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 351.
62. See infra notes 66-121 and accompanying text.
63. In addition to the Hill court, one federal district court and several state courts have
considered and issued decisions on congressional and state term limitations. See, e.g., Thorsted v.
Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (Washington's congressional ballot access law
unconstitutional), aff'd sub nom. Thorsted v. Munro, No. 94-35222 et seq., 1996 WL 39389 (9th
Cir. Jan. 30, 1996); Stumpf v. Lau, 839 P.2d 120, 123 (Nev. 1992) (proposed congressional term
limit measure'" 'palpably' " unconstitutional); Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991) (term
limits for state officeholders constitutional), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 919 (1992); State ex rel.
Maloney v. McCartney, 223 S.E.2d 607 (W.Va. 1976) (term limitation on governor
constitutional), appeal dismissed sub nom. Moore v. McCartney, 425 U.S. 946 (1976); Maddox v.
Fortson, 172 S.E.2d 595, 598-99 (Ga. 1970) (term limitations on state offices constitutional), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 149 (1970).
64. See, e.g., Eid & Kolbe, supra note 38; Tiffanie Kovacevich, Constitutionality of Term
Limitations: Can States Limit the Terms of Members of Congress?, 23 PAC. L.J. 1677 (1992);
Gorsuch & Guzman, supra note 29; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., A Defense Of State Constitutional
Limits On Congressional Terms, 53 U. PITT. L. REv. 97 (1991).
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Nonetheless, the significance of prior cases cannot be, disregarded. In
that the three opinions in U.S. Term Limits, together with the potential
for a reversal of this five-to-four decision,65 make these cases relevant,
they are briefly discussed to make the reader aware of their possible
future significance in similar litigation.
A. Powell v. McCormack
In 1969, the Supreme Court handed down what all but became the
dispositive case in U.S. Term Limits: Powell v. McCormack.66 At issue
was whether the House of Representatives could exclude Adam Clayton
Powell, a duly elected Congressman from New York, from the 90th
Congress. 6  The House had voted in 1967 to exclude Powell for a vari-
ety of alleged unethical acts under its constitutional authority to judge
the qualifications of its members.68 Powell then filed suit, alleging that
because he met each of the three qualifications for service in the House
specified in Article I of the Constitution, the House lacked authority to
refuse to seat him. 69
Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for an eight-to-one majority,70
held that the House was "without authority to exclude any person, duly
65. Although U.S. Term Limits holds without reservation that congressional term limits can
only be enacted through an amendment to the U.S. Constitution, it remains possible that Justice
Stevens' majority opinion could be challenged, particularly should the makeup of the Court
change. Justice Stevens is the Court's oldest member at age 75. Timothy M. Phelps, Judicial
Revolution: Recent Cases Reveal Slant Toward States, NawsoAY, May 29, 1995, at A 13.
Moreover, even with no significant change in membership, the Court has been known to
overrule its own precedent, particularly with regard to federal and state power issues. See, e.g.,
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overruling National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); compare A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935) with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (Court
upholding the National Labor Relations Act and, without explicitly overruling Schecter, backing
away from Schecter's "direct/indirect effects" test of Congress' Commerce Clause authority).
Additionally, pro-term limits groups have vowed not to give up the fight. Beyond pushing
for a constitutional amendment, some plan a variety of strategies to force the issue, which will
likely lead to court challenges. See infra note 281. In the area of abortion, similar efforts by anti-
abortion groups resulted in the Court chipping away at its landmark ruling in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), as states passed laws tinkering with Roe's "fundamental right" to abortion.
Compare Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986) with Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (similar state laws struck down in
Thornburgh later upheld in Planned Parenthood). See also Anita L. Allen, Autonomy's Magic
Wand: Abortion and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U. L. Rv 683 (1992) (discussing this
development in abortion jurisprudence).
66. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
67. Id. at 489.
68. Id. at 489-93, 495. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 ("[e]ach house shall be the judge of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members").
69. Powell, 395 U.S. at 489. See supra note 9 for the text of the clause.
70. Justice Potter Stewart dissented, believing the issue moot because Powell was seated in
the following Congress after being reelected. Powell, 395 U.S. at 559-74 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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elected by his constituents, who meets all the requirements for member-
ship expressly prescribed in the Constitution."71 In reaching its deci-
sion, the Court examined the Qualifications Clauses, their precursors in
England and colonial America, the Constitutional Convention-era
debate, and congressional interpretation of the clauses.72 The breadth of
the Court's opinion implied that the sole requirements for House mem-
bership were listed in the Qualifications Clauses, and that these require-
ments could be altered or added to only by constitutional amendment.73
B. Cases Involving Issues of Federalism
In U.S. Term Limits, Justice Anthony Kennedy eloquently
described federalism as
our Nation's own discovery. The Framers split the atom of sover-
eignty.... The resulting Constitution created a legal system unprec-
edented in form and design, establishing two orders of government,
each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of
mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are
governed by it.74
This concept of divided power and accountability between the state
and federal governments is implicit within the U.S. Constitution. 5 It is
also affirmatively expressed in the Tenth Amendment, which proclaims
that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved by it to the States respec-
tively, or to the people."76 Indeed, strong constitutional support for
state-enacted congressional term limits has been claimed to derive from
the Tenth Amendment.7 7 The Supreme Court attached limited signifi-
71. Id. at 522 (majority opinion).
72. Id. at 523-47.
73. See Erik H. Corwin, Limits on Legislative Terms: Legal and Policy Implications, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 569, 580-82 (1991).
74. 115 S. Ct. at 1872 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
75. "Even before the passage of the Tenth Amendment, it was apparent that Congress would
possess only those powers 'herein granted' by the rest of the Constitution." United States v.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1646 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
76. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
77. The meaning of the Tenth Amendment with regard to states imposing additional
qualifications on their members of Congress was debated early on by Thomas Jefferson and
Justice Joseph Story, though not specifically with regard to limiting congressional terms.
Jefferson believed that while the question was one "on which honest men may differ," the states
may have such power because it was neither exclusively granted to Congress nor denied to the
states in the Constitution. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Jan. 31, 1814), in
THE BEST LETTERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 194 (Joseph Gregoire de Roulhac Hamilton ed., 1926).
Justice Story disagreed, believing that the Tenth Amendment only reserved to the states those
powers they had prior to the adoption of the Constitution. Because the U.S. Congress sprung from
the Constitution, the states had no prior powers to regulate its members' qualifications. See I
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 625-27 (5th ed.,
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cance to this Amendment over the years, 78 at one point casting it aside
as "but a truism. '79 Recently, however, the Court has recognized the
amendment as protecting legitimate state interests from unwarranted
federal interference, beginning in 1976 with National League of Cities v.
Usery.s° Since National League of Cities, the Court has seized upon the
concept of federalism to invalidate several congressional acts as uncon-
stitutionally infringing upon state sovereignty.8 I However, because the
Court's recent Tenth Amendment jurisprudence dealt with congressional
1891). At oral argument in U.S. Term Limits, Justice Scalia offered that the disagreement between
these two esteemed authorities made the issue "very close." Transcript of Oral Argument at 18,
U.S. Term Limits (1994 WL 714634) (Nov. 29, 1994); see Supreme Court Hears Arguments Over
Term Limits, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 30, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Legal News file.
78. For nearly 200 years, the court afforded the Tenth Amendment scant respect. Congress
was typically offered broad powers to legislate as it pleased even when its acts limited state
prerogatives, beginning with McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In that
landmark case, Chief Justice Marshall upheld Congress' creation of a national bank under the
Necessary and Proper clause and denied the states the power to tax it. Id.; see U.S. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 18 (Congress shall have the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers ... ").
Congressional power over the states was increased by the Civil War (and several successive)
Amendments, all explicitly granting Congress the power to enforce same by legislation. See U.S.
CoNsT. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, XIX, XXIII and XXVI. Finally, since the New Deal, Congress
has relied upon its powers to regulate commerce in passing laws affecting many aspects of
American life in any way related to interstate or foreign commerce, regardless of traditional state
authority in the area. See Larry E. Gee, Comment, Federalism Revisited: The Supreme Court
Resurrects the Notion of Enumerated Powers by Limiting Congress 'Attempt to Federalize Crime,
27 ST. MARY's L. J. 151, 167-68 (1995); U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have the
power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States .. "); see
also United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (six opinions discussing Congress' Commerce
Clause power and its effect on state power to legislate in the area).
79. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
80. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,
469 U.S. 528 (1985). National League of Cities invalidated a federal minimum wage law as
applied to state employees, declaring it unconstitutionally infringed upon the states' plenary power
to regulate essential state functions. 426 U.S. at 846. "The (Tenth] Amendment expressly
declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs
the States' integrity or their ability to function efficiently in a federal system." Id. at 843 (quoting
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975)). The Court revisited the issue in Garcia,
overruling National League of Cities in part because its test for what amounted to "traditional
governmental functions" proved unworkable, Garcia, 469 U.S. at 537-47, and in part because the
states retained sufficient protection from federal encroachment in their ability to set voter
qualifications, to have their views treated fairly due to equal Senate representation, and to obtain
federal financial assistance in complying with federal mandates. Id. at 550-55.
81. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (striking down a federal age discrimination
statute as applied to Missouri state judges subject to state mandatory retirement law); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (striking down a federal nuclear waste disposal law as
unconstitutionally forcing the states to choose between two options Congress could not mandate);
United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (striking down a federal law criminalizing gun
possession within school zones as exceeding congressional commerce power and intruding upon
the states' plenary powers).
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overreaching instead of state acts affecting the federal government, its
effect on measures such as Amendment 73 was uncertain.
C. Elections Cases
Article I, section 4 of the Constitution confers authority upon the
States to regulate congressional elections."2 Recognized as a power to
erect a "complete code '8 3 in this vein, term limits proponents viewed
Amendment 73 as fully encompassed within this delegation.,4
The drafters of Amendment 73 carefully phrased it so that it would
limit terms for various state officeholders, but only deny ballot access to
some of Arkansas' incumbent members of Congress without actually
limiting their terms.85 Of course, they did this to avoid any Qualifica-
tions Clauses challenge to the amendment's constitutionality, while at
the same time likely de facto limiting terms.8 6 Assuming application of
Powell could be avoided, they presumably expected prior ballot access
cases to offer Amendment 73 a constitutional safe harbor.
The leading congressional ballot access case is Storer v. Brown,,7
which the Supreme Court handed down in 1974. California law required
that independent candidates for office had to file nomination papers
within sixty days of the election, and that they could neither have voted
in the preceding primary nor been registered with a political party within
a year of that primary. 8 Two potential candidates for the House of Rep-
resentatives who had been registered Democrats earlier in the year filed
suit, alleging the law constituted an additional qualification for congres-
sional office and violated their rights to candidacy, to political associa-
tion, and to vote under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.89 The
Court denied both claims and upheld the law. 90
82. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1: "The Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
chusing Senators." This is known as the "Elections Clause." See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, 115 S.
Ct. at 1869.
83. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).
84. See, e.g., Brief for the State Petitioner, supra note 10, at 31.
85. Compare ARK. CONsT. amend. 73, §§ 1-2 (state officeholders) with § 3 (congressional
delegation). See supra note 1.
86. In fact, two commentators signaled in 1991 that the more constitutionally prudent course
would be to enact term limits, but allow incumbents to be elected by write-in votes. Those
commentators based their opinions on an amendment's potential burden on the right to vote
instead of on any Qualifications Clauses concerns. Gorsuch & Guzman, supra note 29, at 345
n.21, 375.
87. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
88. Id. at 726-27.
89. Id. at 727-29.
90. Id. at 736-37.
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The Storer Court initially examined the First and Fourteenth
Amendment arguments, first determining that the law's purpose was to
regulate election procedures.9' The Court then weighed the state's inter-
ests against the infringements on the plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. 92 The Court found that the law regulated "an inte-
gral part of the entire election process" 93 that "winnow[s] out and finally
reject[s] all but the chosen candidates."94 The Court said the primary
structure prevented voter confusion likely to occur should defeated pri-
mary candidates run as independents in the general election.95 These
interests, the Court concluded, outweighed the plaintiffs' First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights.96
Addressing the Qualifications Clauses argument, the majority held
that the Elections Clause,97 allowing states to regulate elections, author-
ized the law, because the law did not wholly prevent candidacies, but
instead required candidates to choose between a party primary and an
independent candidacy. 98 In a footnote, the Court dismissed the Qualifi-
cations Clauses challenge as "wholly without merit."99
Anderson v. Celebrezze'00 also dealt with a state's right to control
ballot access in federal elections. The case concerned First and Four-
teenth Amendment challenges of a presidential candidate and his sup-
91. See, e.g., Eid & Kolbe, supra note 38, at 48.
92. Id.
93. Storer, 415 U.S. at 735 (footnote omitted).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 736. The dissent concluded otherwise, noting independents would be forced to
establish their candidacy 17 months before the general election, "an impossible burden to
shoulder" in light of the two-year House term. Id. at 758 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. See supra note 82 for the text of the clause.
98. Storer, 415 U.S. at 735-36.
99. Id. at 746 n.16; see also Hopfinann v. Connolly, 746 F.2d 97 (1st Cir. 1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 471 U.S. 459 (1985). Here, a hopeful candidate for the Democratic nomination for
U.S. Senator from Massachusetts was kept off the ballot under a party requirement that candidates
get 15% of the vote at a party convention before getting on the ballot. He argued that this
amounted to an unconstitutional qualification under Article I of the U.S. Constitution. 746 F.2d at
102. In sweeping language supportive of the idea behind Amendment 73, the court wrote:
(Flailure to comply with the 15 percent rule does not render a candidate ineligible
for the office of United States Senator. An individual is free to run as the candidate
of another party, as an independent, or as a write-in candidate. If he is elected and
meets the requirements of Article I, Section 3, he will be qualified to take office....
[T]he test to determine whether or not the "restriction" amounts to a "qualification"
• ..is whether the candidate "could be elected if his name were written in by a
sufficient number of electors."
Id. at 103 (in part quoting State v. Crane, 197 P.2d 864, 871 (Wyo. 1948)); see also Williams v.
Tucker, 382 F. Supp. 381 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (upholding a "sore loser" law that denied general
election ballot access to defeated congressional primary candidates wishing to run as independ-
ents, and which was challenged, in part, as a violation of the Qualifications Clauses).
100. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
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porters; thus the Qualifications Clauses were not at issue. In Anderson,
an Ohio law required independents running for President to file for the
November general election ballot access in March, while mandating that
major party candidates only had to file in March for the June primary.
John Anderson filed for November ballot access as an independent in
May 1980, and was rejected.'
The Supreme Court struck down the Ohio law under a test examin-
ing the character and magnitude of the harm to the plaintiff's First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, the state's interests in burdening the pro-
spective candidate, and the extent to which the state's interest required
imposing such burdens.0 2 Ohio asserted interests in equal treatment for
major and minor political parties, voter education, and political stabil-
ity.'0 3 Although the law was aimed at candidates, the Court found that
voters were indirectly affected, 104 and thus weighed both groups' inter-
ests. The Court held that the state interests were inferior to candidate
interests in running for office and voter interests in choosing specific
candidates and promoting beliefs through association. 10 5 The court
found that the law impermissibly gave major party candidates a greater
period of time to file candidacies and gather signatures for ballot access,
and that it unconstitutionally impaired independent and minor party can-
didates, thus diminishing voter rights of association.' 06
A second line of cases concerning a candidate's right to seek office
deals with resign-to-run laws, which require state officials to resign from
one office before running for Congress or any other office. The chief
case, Clements v. Fashing,10 7 concerned two provisions in the Texas
Constitution. One prohibited all federal, state, and foreign officeholders
from serving in the state legislature. 8 The second forced Texas county
and state officeholders to resign before running for other offices.'0 9 The
plaintiffs were state officeholders who alleged that the provisions dis-
criminated against them as incumbents. They claimed that the provi-
sions violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by effectively
preventing them from running for higher state office." 0 The Supreme
Court upheld the provisions."' Then Associate Justice William Rehn-
101. Id. at 782-83.
102. Id. at 789.
103. Id. at 796.
104. Id. at 786.
105. Id. at 806.
106. Id. at 790-93.
107. 457 U.S. 957 (1982).
108. Id. at 960.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 959-61.
111. Id. at 971-73 (majority opinion); id. at 962-971 (plurality opinion). Justice Rehnquist
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quist first reaffirmed the absence of any fundamental right to run for
office. 12 Then Associate Justice William Rehnquist next found that the
state had interests in maintaining the integrity of state government by
preventing officeholders from disregarding their duties to campaign, and
in preserving its nonpartisan judiciary. 1 3 According to the opinion, the
provisions were only a "de minimis burden upon the political aspirations
of a current officeholder,""' 4 and thus any burden they caused was out-
weighed by the state interests." 5 The Court concluded that because
state officeholders could remain politically active in ways other than
running for office, such as becoming involved in party politics, support-
ing other candidates, and raising and spending money, their First
Amendment rights were not infringed upon to the point where the state's
interest was inferior.' 16
In Burdick v. Takushi,"7 a case factually inapposite with U.S. Term
Limits, yet relevant, the Supreme Court considered a Hawaii law prohib-
iting write-in voting. The Court used this case, brought by a voter desir-
ing to cast a protest vote for Donald Duck," II to announce that Anderson
v. Celebrezze' 19 controls in cases alleging a deprivation of voting rights
by state law.' 20 Using the Anderson test, the Court held Hawaii's prohi-
bition constitutional because the state afforded candidates three liberal
avenues to the ballot: a major party primary victory, a minor party pri-
mary victory, or a relatively simple two-step process to become an
independent candidate. 12'
wrote for the majority with regard to the First Amendment analysis, but only for a plurality on the
14th Amendment issue.
112. Id. at 963 (citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972)).
113. Id. at 968-69.
114. Id. at 967 (emphasis in original).
115. Id. at 966-71.
116. Id. at 972. This argument, however, does not square well with other Supreme Court
decisions on political expression. Cf. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416 n.l 1 (1989) (citing
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 n.4 (1974)) (rejecting notion that form of expression
can be restricted because alternate methods to express the same idea exist); see also Signorelli v.
Evans, 637 F.2d 853 (2nd Cir. 1980), which upheld a similar New York resign-to-run law as
applied to a state judge wishing to run for Congress, which put the Qualifications Clauses at issue.
The court likened the New York law to the U.S. Constitution's Incompatibility Clause, which
prevents current federal officeholders from also serving in Congress. Id. at 859-61; see U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 ("No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was
elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States .. "); see also
Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir.) (upholding a similar California law), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1002 (1983).
117. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
118. Id. at 430, 438.
119. 460 U.S. 780 (1983); see supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text.
120. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438.
121. Id. at 435-38. Hawaii asserted, among others, an interest in preventing those candidates
previously rejected by voters in primaries from becoming "sore-loser" write-in candidates. Id. at
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IV. ANALYSIS OF US TERM LIMITS, INC. v. THORNTON
U.S. Term Limits was decided by a vote of five to four by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion, joined
by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer; Justice Kennedy
penned a thoughtful concurrence on the issue of federalism; Justice
Thomas wrote a scathing dissent garnering the support of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia.
Beyond the issue of limiting congressional terms, the majority and
the dissent in U.S. Term Limits hold fundamentally dichotomous views
on the concepts of democracy and federalism growing from the Tenth
Amendment, and the U.S. Constitution as a whole. Little is made of
case law in the majority and dissenting opinions; the battle is primarily
waged on historical and philosophical warfields. These opposing fac-
tions on the Court were not "sniping [over] technical legalisms,' ' 22 but
instead were rolling out "the heavy artillery of first principles." '23
A. The Majority Opinion
As is often the case in jurisprudence, the manner in which a court
frames the issues to be resolved foreshadows its ultimate decision. Jus-
tice Stevens highlights two that could not have differed more from the
way in which Justice Thomas frames his dissent: 24 First, whether the
congressional qualifications set forth in Article I of the Constitution are
exclusive and shielded from alteration by the states; and second, whether
the construction of Amendment 73 as a "ballot access" regulation was
sufficient to cure it of any qualifications properties.' 25
1. POWELL V. MCCORMACK REVISITED
Following a short factual and procedural discussion, 2 6 the majority
439. The plaintiff asserted interests in casting protest votes and meaningful ballots, among others.
Id. at 437-38. Coupled with the ease of ballot access, the Court concluded that "it can hardly be
said that the laws at issue here unconstitutionally limit access to the ballot ... or unreasonably
interfere with the right of voters to associate and have candidates of their choice placed on the
ballot." Id. at 434.
122. John G. Kester, The Bipolar Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., May 31, 1995, at AI7.
123. Id.
124. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In fact, Justice Thomas
does not even identify the issues for resolution in syllogistic form; he merely announces his
conclusion that:
[n]othing in the Constitution deprives the people of each State of the power to
prescribe eligibility requirements for the candidates who seek to represent them in
Congress. The Constitution is simply silent on this question. And where the
Constitution is silent, it raises no bar to action by the States or the people.
Id.; see infra notes 200-279.
125. Id. at 1847 (majority opinion).
126. Id. at 1845-47. Petitioners in U.S. Term Limits originally challenged the suit by alleging
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opinion begins by setting forth a "full statement"127 of Powell v. McCor-
mack,2 ' the sole case to which the opinion affords great weight. "Our
resolution of these issues draws upon our prior resolution of a related but
distinct issue: whether Congress has the power to add to or alter the
qualifications of its Members."' 29
After briefly chronicling the issue in Powell,30 the majority
focuses on those aspects of Powell most relevant to U.S. Term Limits:
its reliance on history with regard to legislative qualifications and demo-
cratic principles generally. The Powell Court, Stevens notes, was highly
persuaded by the probable impact that the evolution of English prece-
dent on Parliament's ability to set its members' own qualifications had
on the Framers of the Constitution.' 3 1 Of particular interest to the Court
was the late eighteenth-century ordeal of John Wilkes, who was elected
to Parliament, yet denied membership on specious grounds. 32 Stevens
reiterates Powell's finding that by the time the Framers assembled in
Philadelphia, English parliamentary qualifications were deemed "not
occasional but fixed."' 133
Against this historical background, the majority reviews the Fram-
ers' discussions of legislative qualifications, including rejected proposals
that would have granted Congress the power to impose property or any
that the cases were non-justiciable for want of standing and ripeness. Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 353.
The Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed these challenges, however, and rendered judgment on the
merits. Id. at 353-54 (plurality opinion). No justice dissented from the plurality's justiciability
holdings. Id. at 361 (Gerald Brown, Special Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part); id.
at 367 (Dudley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 368 (Hays, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 368 (Cracraft, Special C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The Arkansas trial court also held the case justiciable. Id. at 353 (quoting the trial court's
Conclusions of Law). Petitioners in U.S. Term Limits apparently did not raise the issue before the
U.S. Supreme Court. Reference to justiciability was not found in any of the briefs filed in U.S.
Term Limits obtained by the author, nor was it argued before the Supreme Court, see Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra note 77, and the issue was not mentioned by the majority, concurring, or
dissenting opinions.
127. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1848.
128. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
129. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1847.
130. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
131. The Powell Court examined several challenges to members' qualifications by the English
Parliament and colonial legislatures from 1553 until the Constitutional Convention in 1787.
Powell, 395 U.S. at 522-31.
132. See U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1848-49 (summarizing Powell's discussion of the
Wilkes case). In short, Wilkes, a member of Parliament, was imprisoned and expelled for
seditious libel in the 1760s for his criticism of a peace treaty with France and declared ineligible
for future membership in Parliament. He was nonetheless reelected several times, yet Parliament
refused to seat him until 1782, when it rescinded its prior resolutions and declared them
"subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors of this kingdom." Powell, 395 U.S. at 527-
28 (quoting 22 PARL. HIST. ENG. 1411 (1782)).
133. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1848 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Powell,
395 U.S. at 528) (quoting 16 PARL. HIST. ENG. 589-90 (1769)).
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form of qualifications on its membership. t34 Surveying the ratification
debates, 35 congressional interpretation of the Qualifications Clauses, 36
and the implication of the clauses' exclusivity within the Constitution, 37
Stevens, in effect, reaffirms Powell's holding: "[W]ith respect to Con-
gress, the Framers intended the Constitution to establish fixed
134. "We found particularly revealing the debate concerning a proposal ... [to give] Congress
the power to add property qualifications. James Madison argued that such a power would vest 'an
improper & dangerous power in the Legislature,' by which the Legislature 'can by degrees subvert
the Constitution.' " Id. at 1849 (quoting Powell, 395 U.S. at 533-34) (quoting 2 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 249-50 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter Farrand] (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
135. E.g., Alexander Hamilton's position that "[t]he qualifications of the persons who may
choose or who may be chosen.., are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by
the legislature." Id. (quoting Powell, 395 U.S. at 539) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 371
(Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961)) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Id. at 1850: "[D]uring the first 100 years of its existence, 'Congress strictly limited its
power to judge the qualifications of its members to those enumerated in the Constitution.' "
(quoting Powell, 395 U.S. at 542). Congress, however, has excluded members over the course of
history for reasons beyond failure to comport with the Qualifications Clauses. Powell, 395 U.S. at
541-42. Nonetheless, the Powell Court declared, "[t]hat an unconstitutional action has been taken
before surely does not render that same action any less unconstitutional at a later date." Id. at
546-47.
One interesting episode took place in 1807, when the election of Representative William
McCreery was challenged for failure to comply with what amounted to a state law mandating
district residency. Although the House ultimately seated McCreery without comment, 17 ANNALS
OF CONG. 1235-38 (1807), William Findley, Chairman of the House Committee of Elections,
declared the committee found that "the qualifications of members [were] unalterably determined
by the Federal Convention, unless changed by an authority equal to that which framed the
Constitution at first; that neither the State nor the Federal Legislatures are vested with authority
to add to those qualifications, so as to change them." Id. at 872 (emphasis added). Recall that
Findley argued during the ratification debates that congressional rotation of office was "entirely
excluded" from the Constitution. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. As recognized in
Powell, "[tihe precedential value of [such qualification contests in Congress] tends to increase in
proportion to their proximity to the Convention in 1787." Powell, 395 U.S. at 547 (citing Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926)).
137. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1850 & n.9. Here Stevens is referring to the expressio
unius est exclusio alterius rule of construction. According to this maxim, "the expression of one
thing is the exclusion of the other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 403 (6th ed. 1990).
The Qualifications Clauses list age, citizenship, and state residency requirements for
membership in Congress. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 2 (House) and art. I., § 3, cl. 3 (Senate); see
supra note 9 for the language of the clauses. Applying the maxim, only those qualifications listed
are permitted, to the exclusion of all others.
The Constitution also contains five other arguable qualifications that apply to all federal (and
some state) offices. If the provisions constitute qualifications, they would also fall within the
maxim. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 7 (disqualifying anyone impeached from federal office);
art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (preventing members of Congress from holding other federal office and vice-
versa); art. IV, § 4 (guaranteeing "a Republican Form of Government"); art. VI, cl. 3 (requiring all
federal and state officers to take an oath to support the Constitution); amend. XIV, § 3
(disqualifying those who supported the Confederacy in violation of the Article VI oath from
federal and state office); see also U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1847 n.2 (acknowledging same,
but finding them irrelevant to the case because they are in the text of the Constitution).
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qualifications." 13 8
With regard to the democratic principles on which Powell relied,
"[w]e noted that allowing Congress to impose additional qualifications
would violate that 'fundamental principle of our representative democ-
racy... 'that the people alone should choose whom they please to gov-
ern them.'' 19 Stevens gleans two important factors from this
"fundamental principle." First, Powell recognized the Framers' ideal
that everyone be able to attain elective office. 140 Second, because under
our federal system the people are ultimately the sovereign, they reserve
"the right to choose freely their representatives to the National
Government."' 41
2. STATE POWER TO ESTABLISH QUALIFICATIONS
Acknowledging that Powell did not expressly prohibit additional
qualifications imposed outside of Congress' chambers, Stevens rejects
the petitioners' argument that the Tenth Amendment reserves such a
right to the states because the Constitution does not forbid it to them. 42
138. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1850 (footnote omitted), 1852. Later, Stevens addresses
an argument posited by the Petitioners, that Powell's holding was simply that Congress could not
exclude a member under its power to judge his or her qualifications, and not that Congress could
not add qualifications. Id. at 1851. Responding that "Powell ... is not susceptible to such a
narrow reading," id., Stevens quotes Chief Justice William Rehnquist's opinion in Nixon v. United
States:
[In Powell w]e held that, in light of the three requirements specified in the
Constitution, the word "qualifications"--of which the House was to be the Judge-
was of a precise, limited nature.... [ ]"The qualifications of the persons who may
choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon another occasion, are defined and
fixed in the constitution; and are unalterable by the legislature."[ ]
Our conclusion in Powell was based on the fixed meaning of "qualifications"
set forth in Art. 1, 2. The claim by the House that its power to "be the Judge of the
Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members" was a textual
commitment of unreviewable authority was defeated by the existence of this
separate provision specifying the only qualifications which might be imposed for
House membership.
Id. at 1851 (quoting Nixon v. U.S., 113 S. Ct. 732, 740 (1993)) (citations omitted). Ironically, at
oral argument, Rehnquist seemingly backed away from his own word choice in Nixon, suggesting
that portion of Powell dealing with the exclusivity of the Qualifications Clauses is "dicta, is it not?
•.. And we ... are not bound by dicta." Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 77, at 20.
139. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1850 (quoting Powell, 395 U.S. at 547 (quoting 2
ELLIOT'S DEBATES 257)).
140. For example, the opinion cites Madison's belief that with the exception of the Article I
congressional qualifications, "the door of this part of the federal government is open to merit of
every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to
poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith." Id. (quoting Powell, 395 U.S.
at 540 n.74 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 326) (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (internal quotations marks omitted)).
141. Id. at 1851.
142. Id. at 1852. Stevens also notes the apparent unanimity of courts holding that states could
not impose further qualifications for congressional office and the similar agreement of
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Stevens declares that because the states did not originally possess the
power to add qualifications, the Constitution could not reserve it to
them. 143 He adds that even if this original state power existed, the Fram-
ers intended the Constitution to be the sole source of congressional qual-
ifications, "thereby 'divest[ing]' " the states thereof.'"
The majority first examines the basis of the authority to add con-
gressional qualifications. 4 5 The Petitioners submitted that as the Con-
stitution was a limited excision of state sovereignty, all not expressly
excised remained in toto to the states, including the power to impose
qualifications upon their congressional delegations.' 46 Dismissing this
proposition, Stevens notes that in the 175 years since McCulloch v.
Maryland,147 the Court has recognized that the states retained only those
powers they had prior to the Constitution. Upon ratification, Stevens
reasons, the states did not accede to any new powers to interfere with the
federal government that they obviously could not possess prior to its
existence. 48 Because the Constitution created a national government
responsible to the people, as opposed to an assembly of delegates
responsible to the states,14 9 members of Congress "owe primary alle-
giance not to the people of a State, but to the people of the Nation."' 50
Representatives and Senators are as much officers of the entire union
as is the President. States thus "have just as much right, and no more,
to prescribe new qualifications for a representative as for a presi-
dent .... It is no original prerogative of state power to appoint a
representative, a senator, or president for the union."'' 5 1
commentators prior to Powell. See id. at 1852-53 (citing 18 cases and seven commentaries); id. at
1853 n.14 (also noting conflicting opinions in recent law review articles and collecting same).
143. Id. at 1853-54.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1854-56.
146. Id. at 1854.
147. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
148. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1854: "As Chief Justice Marshall pointed out, an 'original
right to tax' . . . federal entities 'never existed, and the question whether it was been surrendered,
cannot arise.' " (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 430). In addition, "[a]s Justice [Joseph] Story
recognized, 'the states can exercise no powers whatsoever, which exclusively spring out of the
existence of the national government, which the Constitution does not delegate to them .... No
state can say, that it has reserved, what it never possessed.' " Id. (quoting STORY, supra note 77,
§ 627).
149. Id. at 1855, 1863.
150. Id. at 1855.
151. Id. (quoting I STORY, supra note 77, § 627). To support the idea that members of
Congress are federal and not state officers, Stevens points to the fact that Congress, and not the
individual states, judges qualifications for membership (U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 5, cl. 1); that
members are paid by the federal treasury and not by the states that elected them (art. I, § 6, cl. 1);
and that the Constitution delegates to the states the power to select presidential electors (art. II,
§ 1, cl. 2) and administer congressional elections (art. I, § 4, cl. 1). U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at
1855-56.
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Having concluded that the states possess no original power to
impose congressional qualifications, the majority next examines whether
the Constitution delegates such a power to them.152  Here, Stevens
delves into the history that powers his opinion, assessing not only the
Framers' intent and democratic principles, 15 3 but also past practices of
Congress and the states, which "leads unavoidably to the conclusion that
the States lack the power to add qualifications."' 154
During both the Constitutional Convention and the battle for ratifi-
cation, the majority notes, many people were concerned that the states
would seek to improperly meddle with the workings of the federal gov-
ernment.' 55 In response, the Framers limited the extent to which states
could interfere with federal elections, 156 required that the federal govern-
ment pay members of Congress 157 and provided that the House and Sen-
ate, not the states, judge their members' qualifications. 158 In addition,
the majority finds it compelling that during the ratification debates no
one even suggested that the states could add qualifications, including
term limits, beyond those in the Constitution. 159
152. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1855-56.
153. Stevens reiterates the principles highlighted in Powell, e.g., the "egalitarian ideal-that
election to the National Legislature should be open to all people of merit...," id. at 1862, and "the
right of the people to vote for whom they wish," id. at 1863. He adds that because members of
Congress represent the people of the nation collectively and not the states individually, permitting
a patchwork of differing qualifications by state would "sever the direct link that the Framers found
so critical between the National Government and the people of the United States." Id. at 1864
(footnote omitted).
154. Id. at 1856.
155. Id. at 1856-60.
156. For example, by requiring that voter qualifications for federal elections be the same as
those for state elections, "to prevent discrimination against federal electors .. " Id. at 1857.
Furthermore, the Framers feared the states might abuse their discretion under the Elections Clause
and decline to hold congressional elections to, in effect, kill the federal government. Id. at 1857-
58. Thus, they provided that Congress could "make or alter" election regulations concurrent with
state authority. Id.
157. Id. at 1858. The Framers feared that if federal representatives depended on their states for
compensation, it could be used as a carrot to improperly influence congressional conduct or set so
low as to discourage the most qualified candidates from seeking office. Id. (citing I Farrand,
supra note 134, at 216, 372-73).
158. Id. at 1859. The majority reasoned that because federal questions should be decided
uniformly, federal law, rather than state law, generally controls the decisions. State qualifications
for membership in Congress would require a court to examine state law which would conflict with
the perceived intentions of the Framers. Id. (citing Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590
(1875)); cf Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 27 (1972) (U.S. Senate could ignore Indiana's
ballot recount and declare the victor of a close election under Article 1, § 5 of the Constitution).
159. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1859. Stevens notes that the absence of a rotation-of-
office provision was "a major source of controversy." Id.; see also supra notes 32-40 and
accompanying text. The Anti-Federalists disparaged the Constitution for its failure to include
term limitations. By implication, they must have believed the states did not have the power to
limit terms. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1859-60. Consequently, Stevens writes:
[I]f it had been assumed that States could add additional qualifications, that
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Reviewing congressional and state practices after ratification with
regard to whether the states could set qualifications for service in Con-
gress, the majority finds "further evidence of the general consensus on
the lack of state power in this area." 60 As explained in Powell, congres-
sional interpretation of the exclusivity of the Qualifications Clauses has
differed over the years.' 6' But Stevens indicates that even this irregular
practice shows the absence of a general understanding that states could
add to congressional qualifications. 62  Finally, although Virginia
required its congressional delegation to be landholders for the first fif-
teen years of the new federal government, 63 no other state imposed a
similar requirement (although many mandated that state legislators be
freeholders).164 Furthermore, while some states limited the terms of
their state officials and delegates to the Continental Congress, no state
sought to similarly limit its federal representatives. 65
The majority concludes that these facts, taken together, exhibit con-
clusively that the Framers intended that "neither Congress nor the States
should possess the power to supplement the exclusive qualifications set
forth in the text of the Constitution."'1 66
3. PERMISSIBLE BALLOT ACCESS REGULATION OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL
QUALIFICATION?
The majority then faces the real issue in U.S. Term Limits: whether
Amendment 73 was saved from invalidity because it allowed incum-
bents to be reelected by write-in vote. The petitioners argued that even
if the Constitution denied the states the ability to impose qualifications
for membership in Congress, Amendment 73, by only denying ballot
access, was merely an election regulation, authorized by the Constitution
and the Court's own precedent.1 67
assumption would have provided the basis for a powerful rebuttal to the arguments
being advanced. The failure of intelligent and experienced advocates to utilize this
argument must reflect a general agreement that its premise was unsound, and that
the power to add qualifications was one that the Constitution denied the States.
Id. at 1860 (footnote omitted).
160. Id. at 1861, 1866.
161. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
162. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1861-62. Nonetheless, Stevens focuses on three cases in
which Congress found that the states could not impose additional qualifications. Id. (House
seating William McCreery notwithstanding his failure to meet a state district residency
requirement; Senate seating Charles Faulkner and Pierre Salinger).
163. Id. at 1865 (citing 1788 Va. Acts, ch. 2, § 2 and 1813 Va. Acts, ch. 23, § 2).
164. Id. at 1865 & n.35.
165. Id. at 1865-66.
166. Id. at 1866.
167. Id. at 1866-67.
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The petitioners pointed to Storer v. Brown168 for the proposition
that if an election regulation only limits ballot access, it cannot amount
to an unconstitutional qualification for office. 16 9 The majority quickly
dispenses with this argument, concluding that Amendment 73 is an indi-
rect attempt to skirt the Qualifications Clauses. 170  "As we have often
noted, '[c]onstitutional rights would be of little value if they could be
... indirectly denied.' ",171 "The Constitution 'nullifies sophisticated as
well as simple-minded modes' of infringing on Constitutional protec-
tions. "172 Even though some congressional incumbents could perhaps
mount a successful write-in campaign, 73 the majority states that it can-
not countenance such a small " 'glimmer[ ] of opportunity' -17 and
allow the Framers' efforts to be defeated by an end run around the Qual-
ifications Clauses. 75
The majority also rejects the petitioners' position that Amendment
168. 415 U.S. 724 (1974); see supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
169. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1867.
170. Id. In support of this view, Stevens refers to the finding of the Hill plurality that the
provision is "an 'effort to dress eligibility to stand for Congress in ballot access clothing,' because
the 'intent and effect of Amendment 73 are to disqualify congressional incumbents from further
service,' " Id. at 1867, 1868 n.44 (quoting Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 357). Stevens accepts the state
court conclusion as binding. Id. at 1867. Additionally, Stevens notes that the preamble to
Amendment 73 reads that Arkansans "herein limit the terms of elected officials." Id. at 1868. See
supra note 1.
171. Id. at 1867 (quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965) (quoting Smith v.
Allright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944)).
172. Id. (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939) and citing Harman, 380 U.S. at
540-41). See also Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster & MacLeod, 247 U.S. 105, 114 (1918) ("a
constitutional power cannot be used by way of condition to attain an unconstitutional result")
(citations omitted).
173. Stevens notes the Court has in the past viewed this possibility as bleak, U.S. Term Limits,
115 S. Ct. at 1868 n.45, and that experience has borne this out. Id. at n.43 (since 1913, only one in
more than 1,300 Senators elected by write-in vote; since 1900, only five in more than 20,000
elected by write-in vote in the House); see, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 799 n.26
(1983).
174. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1868 n.43 (quoting Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 357).
175. Id. at 1868. Amendment 73
trivializes the basic principles of our democracy.... [and] treats the Qualifications
Clauses not as the embodiment of a grand principle, but rather as empty formalism.
"'It is inconceivable that guaranties [sic] embedded in the Constitution of the
United States may thus be manipulated out of existence.' "
Id. (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960) (quoting Frost & Frost Trucking
Co. v. Railroad Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926)). For an application of this principle
in a similar term limit case, see Thorsted v. Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068, 1081, aff'd sub nom.
Thorsted v. Munro, No. 94-35222 et seq., 1996 WL 39389 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 1996):
[The congressional] ballot access provision would thus have the practical effect of
imposing a new qualification: non-incumbency beyond the specified periods. The
intended and probable result would be the same as if the State were to adopt non-
incumbency as an absolute requirement. A state may not do indirectly what the
Constitution forbids it to do directly.
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73 is a manner regulation permitted by that the Elections Clause.'7 6
First, the Court concludes that if it accepted the petitioners' argument,
Congress could, in effect, modify the qualifications of its members
through the Elections Clause grant of power to "make or alter" a state's
regulations. This would directly contradict the majority's earlier finding
that the Framers intended that Congress be denied the ability to meddle
with its qualifications for membership. 77
Second, the majority distinguishes Amendment 73's ballot access
orientation from prior cases upholding election regulations, which
"served the state interest in protecting the integrity and regularity of the
election process"'178 without "even arguably impos[ing] any substantive
qualification rendering a class of potential candidates ineligible for a
ballot position,"'' 79 let alone denying ballot access to candidates with
popular support. 80 The majority similarly distinguishes resign-to-run
laws,' 8' also cited by the petitioners for support, as a "permissible
attempt to regulate state officeholders,"'2 and not " 'a desire ...to
impose additional qualifications to serving in Congress.' 183
The majority also focuses on the Framers' understanding of the
Elections Clause. 8 4 In the Federalist Papers and during the ratification
debates, the Framers viewed this clause as "grant[ing] States authority to
create procedural regulations, not provid[ing] States with license to
176. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1868-69; see supra note 82 for the text of the Elections
Clause.
177. Id. at 1869 ("We refuse to adopt an interpretation of the Elections Clause that would so
cavalierly disregard what the Framers intended to be a fundamental constitutional safeguard.").
178. Id. at 1870.
179. Id.; see, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (discussed supra at notes 87-99
and accompanying text and upholding California ballot access provisions to maintain orderly
elections); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 25 (1972) (state regulations to ensure "fair and
honest" elections are allowed); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (states may pass
laws to make sure that elections operate "equitably and efficiently."); see also U.S. Term Limits,
115 S. Ct. at 1870 (quoting same).
Indeed, by encouraging congressional incumbents to mount write-in campaigns, Amendment
73 would likely create havoc in elections by encouraging a popular incumbent barred from the
ballot to run against not only a rival from an opposing party, but also a member of her own party,
for the office Amendment 73 seemingly forced her to vacate. Thus, Amendment 73 would
undercut the principle underlying the Court's Elections Clause decisions by likely causing post-
primary intraparty battles, and leading to probable voter confusion. For a discussion of these
issues, see the Amicus Curiae Brief of the California Democratic Party, et al., at 12-19, U.S. Term
Limits (Nos. 93-1456 and 93-1828).
180. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1870.
181. See supra notes 107-116 and accompanying text.
182. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1870 n.48 (citing Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957
(1982)). :
183. Id. (quoting Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523, 1528 (9th Cir. 1983)).
184. Id. at 1869; see supra note 82 for the text of the Clause.
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exclude classes of candidates from federal office."'1 5
In conclusion, the majority recognizes that the merits of term limi-
tations are as much a matter of debate today as they were at the creation
of the Constitution. But because "[w]e are ...firmly convinced that
allowing the several States to adopt term limits for congressional service
would effect a fundamental change in the constitutional framework,"' 86
a constitutional amendment is required to set them in place.' 87
B. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority, but chose also to submit
a brief opinion responding more in depth to the dissent to "explain why
that course of argumentation runs counter to fundamental principles of
federalism."'' 88 Crafted as a philosophical declaration of the protections
that federalism affords to American citizens, collecting dicta in support,
the concurrence stands less as a leviathan of authority, but more as a
reasoned beacon for future jurisprudence in this area, akin to Justice
Black's highly regarded explanation of presidential war power authority
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.'"9
In describing the rights appurtenant to and character of a federalist
system, Justice Kennedy begins by highlighting the source of the
national government's power, and to whom it is responsible: the citi-
zens of the United States. 190 The people, Kennedy proclaims, have sep-
arate and independent, though consistent, political identities-one
185. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1869. For example, Madison suggested the clause
involved such procedural matters as "[w]hether the electors should vote by ballot or vivi voce,
should assemble at this place or that place; should be divided into districts or all meet at one place,
sh[oul]d all vote for the representatives; or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the
district." Id. (quoting 2 Farrand, supra note 134, at 240). Similarly, proponents of the Clause
noted during the ratification debates that "'[t]he power over the manner only enables them to
determine how these electors shall elect-whether by ballot, or by vote, or by any other way.'"
Id. (quoting 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES 71) (emphasis in original).
186, Id. at 1871.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1872 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
189. 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Although his was not the majority
opinion, Justice Jackson's concurrence has garnered much of the attention in subsequent cases
involving foreign policy, separation-of-power issues. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654, 661 (1981) (Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown "brings together as much
combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this area").
190. "A distinctive character of the National Government, the mark of its legitimacy, is that it
owes its existence to the act of the whole people that created it." U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at
1872 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The "republican principles" upon which it was founded,
makes it 'a national government,' not merely a federal one ..... The Court
confirmed this ...when it said, 'The government of the Union, then ... is,
emphatically, and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it
emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised
directly on them, and for their benefit.'
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national and one state.' 9 ' He writes that McCulloch v. Maryland'92 sub-
stantiates this by confirming the notion that the federal government was
"controlled by the people without collateral interference by the
states."
93
Kennedy does not deny the states' importance in our system of
government, but he rejects the idea that states may project themselves
onto the "sovereign federal province."' 94 The mere fact that people vote
in the states in which they reside, electing fellow state residents to Con-
gress and to be presidential electors, both pursuant to state law, does not
impart a delegation of the people's federal power to their states, but
merely reflects that the Constitution is "solicitous of the prerogatives of
the States .... -19 When people vote in congressional elections, they
"act in a federal capacity and exercise a federal right."'196 Thus, Ken-
nedy concludes, the states have no authority to intrude beyond any
power that the Constitution itself confers. 97
Concomitant with the citizenry's protected right to participate in
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245, and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 404-05 (1819), respectively).
191. Id. at 1872-73 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) and Crandall v.
Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43 (1868)).
192. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
193. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1873 (Kennedy, J., concurring). State interference with
"federal powers... 'was not intended by the American people. They did not design to make their
government dependent upon the states.'" Id. (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 432). This
recognition cuts both ways, Kennedy notes. "That the States may not invade the sphere of federal
sovereignty is as incontestable in my view as the corollary proposition that the Federal
Government must be held within the boundaries of its own power when it intrudes upon matters
reserved to the States." Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)).
194. id.
195. Id. Spurning the argument that the people delegate their power to the states under the
Constitution because they ratified it not by a federal convention, but instead through individual
state conventions, Kennedy writes,
in McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court set forth its authoritative rejection of this idea:
'The Convention which framed the constitution was indeed elected by
the State legislatures. But the instrument ... was submitted to the
people. . . . It is true, they assembled in the several States-and
where else should they have assembled? No political dreamer was
ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate
the States, and of compounding the American people into one
common mass. Of consequence, when they act, they act in their
States. But the measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to
be the measures of the people themselves, or become the measures of
the State governments.'
Id. (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 403).
196. Id. at 1873-74 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663-
64 (1884) (voters in congressional elections do not "owe their right to vote to the State") and
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941) (the right to vote in congressional elections "is
a right secured by the Constitution" against "the action of individuals as well of states")).
197. Id. at 1873.
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federal elections, Kennedy argues, are "privileges and immunities pro-
tected from state abridgement by the force of the Constitution itself."' 8
By assuming the power to limit voters' choices in future federal elec-
tions by attaching significance to whom they vote for presently, Arkan-
sas unconstitutionally encroached upon federal rights which it has no
power to burden.' 99
C. Justice Thomas' Dissent
In opening his dissent, Justice Thomas fires a cannonball of irony
across the bows of the majority and concurrence. Disputing Stevens'
view that Amendment 73 violates "the right of the people to 'choose
whom they please to govern them,' "2 Thomas calls attention to the
reality that only the people of Arkansas can make the choice of who
Arkansas sends to Congress. "The majority therefore defends the right
of the people of Arkansas to 'choose whom they please to govern them'
198. Id. at 1874. In the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), the Court
suggested that certain rights of federal citizenship were not confined to specific constitutional
sources.
Referring to these rights of national dimension and origin the Court observed: "But
lest it should be said that no such privileges and immunities are to be found if those
we have been considering are excluded, we venture to suggest some which owe
their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or
its laws."
U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1874 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. at 79).
199. Id. at 1874-75 (citing Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922) and Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)). Kennedy also mentions, without discussing, the potential First
Amendment concerns that Amendment 73 raises. Id. at 1874.
It should be noted, however, that the Court has never found that term limits violate the First
or Fourteenth Amendments, and has twice passed on the opportunity to rule on those questions.
State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney, 223 S.E.2d 607 (W.Va. 1976) (Fourteenth Amendment
challenge to gubernatorial term limit), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question
sub nom. Moore v. McCartney, 425 U.S. 946 (1976); Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991)
(First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to state legislative term limits), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 919 (1992). Lower courts, however, have ruled on such challenges. Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 349
(upholding state legislative term limits under the First and Fourteenth Amendments); Thorsted v.
Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (striking down congressional term limits under
the Qualifications Clauses and the First and Fourteenth Amendments), aff'd sub nom. Thorsted v.
Munro, No. 94-35222 et seq., 1996 WL 39389 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 1996). One federal district court
recently expressed reservations about the constitutionality of the state term limits upheld in Eu,
but has yet to rule on the new federal challenge. Bates v. Jones, 904 F. Supp. 1080 (N.D. Cal.
1995); see Dan Morain, Judge Questions Constitutionality of State Term Limits, L.A. TIMEs, Sept.
13, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Major Papers file. Similar lawsuits challenging
state legislative term limits as a result of the US Term Limits decision have been filed in
Massachusetts and Nebraska. Term Limit Foes Launch Lawsuits in Two States, Mar. 9, 1996,
available on Congressional and State Term Limits Homepage of the Internet, at http://
www.termlimits.org/twolawsuits.shtml [hereinafter Term Limit Foes].
200. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S.Ct at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 1845, 1850-51,
1862 (majority opinion)).
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by invalidating a provision that won nearly 60% of the votes cast in a
direct election and that carried every congressional district in the
State.' 20 1
Thomas dissects the majority's case in three areas: first, that the
states and their citizens reserved all powers of action not expressly pro-
scribed by the Constitution; second, that the Qualifications Clauses do
not withhold from the states the right to add thereto; and third, that by
allowing congressional incumbents to win election by write-in vote and
by only denying them ballot access after a certain length of prior service,
Amendment 73 in no way amounts to an additional qualification for
Congress.20 2 Like Stevens, Thomas relies extensively on history in sup-
porting his views, though using it to reach different conclusions.
Labelled both "careless ' 203 and "irresponsible ' '204 by critics, this lengthy
and well-researched dissent, collecting the signatures of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Scalia, highlights the present
division on the Court regarding federal and state authority.
Throughout his opinion Thomas attacks the logic of both the major-
ity and the concurrence, sometimes appearing downright nasty. But his
dissent often suffers from the same flaws as the opinions it attacks.
Thomas also raises an interesting question of who carries the burden of
persuasion, particularly with regard to the historical evidence. The
majority concludes that inconclusive data does not stand for Thomas'
position; Thomas argues it stands against the majority reaching out to
overturn a measure overwhelmingly approved by the people of Arkan-
sas. This idea of popular sovereignty permeates his entire argument,
beginning with his theory of "reserved powers."
1. RESERVATION OF POWERS BY THE STATES
The first important step Thomas takes in his attempt to tear down
the majority is to state his view of how the people's sovereign powers
are reserved.
Our system of government rests on one overriding principle: all
power stems from the consent of the people. To phrase the principle
in this way, however, is to be imprecise about something important to
the notion of "reserved" powers. The ultimate source of the Constitu-
tion's authority is the consent of the people of each individual State,
201. Id. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 1875, 1884, 1909.
203. Jeffrey Rosen, Terminated. US. Supreme Court Overturns States' Congressional Term
Limits, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 12, 1995, at 12.
204. Phelps, supra note 65 (quoting University of California Law Professor Harry N.
Scheiber). Professor Scheiber, a leading federalism expert, also called Thomas' historical analysis
"weird and almost incoherent." Id.
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not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a
whole.2 °5
Thomas supports this notion in two ways. First, he notes that the
Constitution's ratification procedure 20 6 provided that the document was
to take effect only upon approval by nine of the thirteen states-but only
upon the people in those states so ratifying 07 This, he states, necessar-
ily implies that the people surrendered power to the new government not
as a unified public, but instead through their individual states.20
Second, Thomas reads the Tenth Amendment as confirming this
understanding.20 9 By reserving powers to the States or to the people,
"the Amendment avoids taking any position on the division of power
between the state governments and the people of the States: it is up to
the people of each state to determine which of the 'reserved' powers
their state government may exercise. "210
205. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1875 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
206. "The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the
Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same." U.S. CONST. art.
VII.
207. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1875 (Thomas, J. dissenting). Here Thomas implicitly
agrees with Justice Kennedy's observation that in federal elections, the people are not acting on
behalf of their states. Thomas is correct that only those states that ratified the Constitution were
bound by it. But because Article VII called for at least nine states to ratify the Constitution before
it took effect, by its own terms the Constitution elevated those individual ratifications into a
collective national act, rather than state acts. For example, when Delaware residents ratified the
Constitution, citizens in eight other states still had to do so to give life to the national charter. And
when a second state ratified the plan, it did not take effect between those two states-they needed
the voters in seven more states to do so. The ratification by the citizens of the ninth state bound
not only themselves to the Constitution; it also bound voters in the eight states who had previously
approved it.
Of course, once the ninth state did ratify the Constitution, the people in the 41 others that
followed through the years bound only themselves. But by then, the national government was
erected, with powers already delegated and reserved. In truth, those 41 states were simply seeking
admission to a preexisting Union, under previously defined terms.
208. Id. "In Madison's words, the popular consent upon which the Constitution's authority
rests was 'given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing
the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong.'" Id. at 1875-76 (quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 243 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). As argued supra,
at note 207, Thomas' spin on this method of ratification does not necessarily comport with what
actually happened. At the time of the ratification conventions, before the Constitution went into
effect, the people did not truly compose "one entire nation," but instead were basically members
of thirteen sovereign states. See ARTS. OF CONFEDERATION art. II: "Each state retains its
sovereignty, freedom and independence ... not ... expressly delegated .... "; see RoSSITER,
supra note 22, at 23, 37-38 (describing the uncertain status of "nationhood" at the time). People
could not be voting on behalf of an "entire nation" that did not clearly exist. Their votes were for
the creation, but not necessarily on behalfofa nation. Only when the people of nine states ratified
the Constitution did their votes elevate to a national level.
209. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1876 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
210. Id. Thomas questions whether the phrase "the people" in the Tenth Amendment means
the people of the nation or of each State. He rejects the former proposition as making "no sense"
because the Constitution makes no provision for the exercise of any powers by the people as a
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Thomas concludes that the structure of the Constitution "does not
erase state boundaries, but rather tracks them." '' Thus, he argues,
either a state or its people, including the people of Arkansas in enacting
Amendment 73, can exercise the powers reserved by the Tenth Amend-
ment absent an express constitutional prohibition. 212 Thomas argues the
majority cannot identify this required prohibition, and attacks their
attempts to do so. 2 13
Confronting Stevens' position that the states could only reserve
those powers that they held before the Constitution (which would
exclude powers over the new federal government),2 " Thomas posits that
because the people originally delegated their power, they also did the
reserving.21 5 And because the power to govern at all levels springs from
the people, "it would simply be incoherent to assert that the people of
the States could not reserve any powers that they had not previously
controlled. '216
whole, permitting only ratification of amendments by state conventions or legislatures. Id. at
1876-77. This conclusion has a fatal flaw: At the time of ratification, it was not up to "the people
... to determine which 'reserved' powers their State governments may exercise," as the people
did not possess the power to amend their state constitutions without legislative assistance or
approval, and most still do not. See infra notes 252, 257.
211. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1877 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In support of the position
that by ratifying the Constitution within their states, "the people of each State retained their
separate political identities," id., Thomas offers an unpersuasive rejection of Justice Kennedy's
contrary interpretation of Chief Justice Marshall's proclamation in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). See supra note 195 and accompanying text. Thomas argues that
Marshall, by declaring that the Constitution was submitted to the people as one group, was simply
rejecting a lawyer's argument that the Constitution was "merely a 'compact between the States.' "
U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1877 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at
363). This is contrary to what the words assert: "[Wlhen [the people] act, they act in their States.
But the measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the measures of the people
themselves, or become the measures of the State governments." McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 403
(emphasis added).
212. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1877 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 1877-84.
214. See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
215. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1878 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
216. Id. Thomas acknowledges Justice Story's agreement with the majority-see supra note
148-but dismisses Story's view because "he was not a member of the Founding generation." Id.
at 1880. Thomas further notes that Story wrote 50 years after the Constitutional Convention, and
that the Court has rejected other views of Justice Story on federal/state constitutional relations. Id.
Thomas instead embraces the view of Thomas Jefferson, who believed that because the
Constitution did not declare the Qualifications Clauses to be exclusive, or prohibit the states from
adding to them, "Of course, then, by the tenth amendment, the power is reserved to the State[s]."
Id. at 1888-89 (quoting Letter to Joseph C. Cabell (Jan. 31, 1814), in 14 WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 82-83 (A. Lipscomb ed., 1904). Jefferson, however, conceded that it is "one of the
doubtful questions on which honest men may differ with the purest of motives." Id. Thomas
claims that the "of course" that Jefferson used in that context "suggests that he himself did not
entertain serious doubts of its correctness." Id. at 1889 n.14. Of course, while Story was not a
member of the Founding generation, was only expressing his own opinion written in 1833, and
was sometimes wrong in his opinions; Jefferson was neither in attendance at the Constitution
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The incoherency appears to be Thomas' own, however. The sole
distinction between the majority and Thomas here is whether the
"reserved powers" include the power to affect the federal government.
Thomas' astonishing interpretation of the Tenth Amendment would
mean that the people may enact any measures to tinker with the national
government that the Constitution does not expressly or by necessary
implication divest from them. 17 Although Article I empowers Congress
to make its own rules,2 18 becuase it does not expressly deny power to the
people to do so, this theory raises the question of whether Thomas
would allow the states to enact their own rules for their congressional
delegations, or here does the Constitution necessarily divest them of
it. 2 19
Thomas further argues that the majority incorrectly understood the
holding of McCulloch v. Maryland.220 He suggests that the case turned
not on whether powers the states did not possess prior to the Constitu-
tion were reserved to them,z21 but on whether Congress had the power to
create a national bank, and thus whether the Constitution's Supremacy
Convention (WILLARD S. RANDALL, THOMAS JEFFERSON: A LIFE 474 (1993)); nor, as Secretary of
State, was he in Congress as the Tenth Amendment was drafted (see RossITER, supra note 22, at
302-05), he was only expressing his own opinion in 1814; and he, too, was sometimes fallible.
See RANDALL, supra, at 505-06 (Jefferson arguing a national bank would be unconstitutional);
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 400 (1819) (upholding constitutionality of national bank).
217. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1879. Thomas apparently believes there are indeed some
powers prohibited to the states, although he does not square it with his Tenth Amendment view or
explain how he would define "necessary." See id. at 1851-52 n.12 (majority opinion) (criticizing
Justice Thomas' "default rule" that everything not expressly or by necessary implication delegated
is reserved to the states); id. at 1879 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (responding and claiming he
agrees with himself).
218. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings ... ").
219. For example, could the people of Iowa enact a measure mandating that one of its
Representatives hold higher rank than his or her counterparts from Iowa, regardless of seniority?
Or could Texas direct that its Senators sit only on energy and aerospace committees? See Mark P.
Petracca, Term Limits Should Pass Constitutional Test, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 25, 1992, at 11 A
(advancing a similar argument that term limits are not qualifications but instead are "feature[s] of
the institutional design of a legislature" which the people could constitutionally modify by
external means).
220. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1879-80 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
221. Id. Thomas claims the majority's view of McCulloch renders Marshall's Supremacy
Clause discussion irrelevant, "because the power [to tax the bank] could not fall into the category
of 'reserved' powers anyway." Id. at 1880. However, Thomas fails to show why Marshall
bothered to discuss Maryland's original taxing powers if the case indeed rested solely upon the
Supremacy Clause. Thomas attempts to do so by noting this alleged dictum was made "[iln part"
in response to argument of counsel, id. at 1880 n.6, but does not explain the remaining reasons or
how they support his conclusion.
Thomas concedes that McCulloch also rested on the principle that one state may not tax the
federal government, thereby subjecting all Americans to one state's taxing power. Id. But he
argues that this proves his point that states cannot tinker with national institutions, be they
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Clause222 "affirmatively barred" Maryland from imposing a tax upon the
bank. 23 To Thomas, MeCulloch would only apply to Amendment 73 if
there were an affirmative constitutional bar to its execution.
Thomas next turns to the majority's claim that members of Con-
gress represent the nation as a whole, and hence are immune from indi-
vidual state qualifications.224 He dismisses the issue of whom members
represent when they enter Congress as irrelevant,225 focusing instead on
the fact that their selection lies with the states individually. "[O]nce the
representatives chosen by the people of each State assemble in Con-
gress, they form a national body and are beyond the control of the indi-
vidual States until the next election. But the selection of representatives
in Congress is indisputably the act of the people of each State ....
This truism, which must "baffle the majority," Thomas asserts, would be
aptly demonstrated should a citizen of Georgia attempt to vote in a Mas-
sachusetts congressional election.2 27
Digging deeper, Thomas agrees with the majority that states cannot
establish presidential qualifications. 228 But he adds that, "We have long
understood that they do have the power... to set qualifications for their
presidential qualifications or a national bank, but that they can meddle with the qualifications of
their own members of Congress. Id.
Here Thomas seems to make what should be the majority's point. For example, were a state
to decide that its members of Congress should all be in favor of dismantling the interstate highway
system and impose qualifications to that effect, their presence in Congress would no longer serve
to represent the nation as a whole. Cf id. at 1855 (majority opinion) (members of Congress "owe
primary allegiance not to the people of a State, but to the people of the Nation.").
222. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
Supreme Law of the Land .... ").
223. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1879 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
224. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
225. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1881 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Political scientists can
debate about who commands the 'primary allegiance' of Members of Congress once they reach
Washington.").
226. Id. Thomas also castigates Justice Kennedy's suggestion that because voting in a
congressional election is a federally protected right, doing so amounts to a federal action. "[T]he
concurring opinion is . . . saying that the people of Arkansas cannot be permitted to inject
themselves into the process by which they themselves select Arkansas' representatives in
Congress." Id. (quoting In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890) (electors in federal elections not
federal officers or agents)).
227. Id. at 1882. Thomas again appears to undercut his own argument. Assume Massachusetts
imposed a qualification in 1996 that its U.S. Senators not be incumbents at the time of election.
Should, hypothetically, Newt Gingrich move from Georgia to Massachusetts in 1997 and wish to
reelect Ted Kennedy to the U.S. Senate, he could not vote for the Senator of his choice due to the
prior actions of Massachusetts citizens in electing Kennedy to his current term while Newt was a
Georgia citizen. Cf id. at 1874 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If the majority of [Arkansas] voters
had been successful in selecting a candidate, they would be penalized from exercising that same
right in the future.").
228. Id. at 1883 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
TERM LIMITS
Presidential electors," as long as those measures do not violate other
constitutional provisions.229 Because the Constitution does not "affirma-
tively grant[ ] this power, the power must be one that is 'reserved' to the
states. It necessarily follows that the majority's understanding of the
Tenth Amendment is incorrect, for the position of Presidential elector
surely 'spring[s] out of the existence of the national government.' "230
Finally on this issue, Thomas also disputes the majority's claim that
had the states possessed reserved powers over congressional elections,
the Framers would not have "delegated" them the power to set the time,
place, and manner of elections. 23' According to Thomas, the Constitu-
tion requires that states hold these elections, and while reserved powers
may be contrary to delegations, they are perfectly consistent with
duties.232
Thomas "take[s] it to be established, then, that the people of Arkan-
sas enjoy 'reserved' powers over the selection of their representatives in
Congress. 23 3 He then turns to his view that with these reserved powers
in hand, the people cannot be denied term limitations unless the Consti-
229. Id. (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968) and McPherson v. Blacker, 146
U.S. 1, 27-36 (1892)).
230. Id. (quoting id. at 1854 (majority opinion)). Thomas concedes that Article 11, § I,
authorizing each state to appoint its presidential electors, may give the power to establish the
electors' qualifications. Id. at 1883 n.9. But he argues that the majority may not take this
position, because if the word "manner" in this clause permits the states to set qualifications for
presidential electors, then its use in the Elections Clause would permit the states to set
qualifications for members of Congress. Id.
At first glance, Thomas appears to have a strong point. The majority's analysis does focus
on whether the states had an original power, and if so, whether the Constitution precludes their
exercising it. See id. at 1854 (majority opinion). However, although both this clause and the
Elections Clause use the word "manner," the context in which it is used differs. See U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
number of [presidential] Electors ...."); id. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 ("The Times, Places, and Manner of
holding Elections [for Congress] shall be prescribed [by the state legislatures] ....") In the
former, the states are permitted to wholly decide how the electors are chosen; in the latter, they are
only allowed to decide how to conduct the elections. Whereas the states' powers under the
Elections Clauses are limited, in the least, to electing those meeting the Qualifications Clauses, the
Presidential Elector Clause has no similar limitation, which would presumably allow the states the
unfettered right to select electors as they please. Thomas' own choice of authority in the Tenth
Amendment debate suggests he is wrong here. See U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1888 (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (quoting 14 WRITINGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 82) (" 'Had the Constitution been
silent, nobody can doubt ... the right to prescribe... [congressional] qualifications ... would
have belonged to the State[s].").
231. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1883-84 (discussing U.S. CONST. art I., § 4, cl. 1) ("The
Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof .. ") (emphasis added).
232. Id. Thomas appears to misread the Clause, however. Although the Elections Clause does
read "shall," it requires only that the states hold elections, delegating to the states how they
specifically comply with the mandate. See supra note 82.
233. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1884 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
1996]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tution otherwise forbids them.234
2. THE QUALIFICATIONS CLAUSES
Thomas rejects the majority's position that the Framers intended
the Qualifications Clauses to be exclusive, preventing the people and the
states from setting their own membership requirements.235  First,
Thomas argues that these clauses merely set minimum requirements for
service in Congress. 236 Second, to the extent the Framers wanted mem-
bership in Congress open to all satisfying the Clauses, he maintains that
their desires were directed only at preventing Congress from adding
qualifications, not the people or the states. 237 Finally, he disputes Ste-
vens' evidence that the founding generation generally understood the
Clauses to be unalterable by any political body, concluding the majority
failed to meet its burden.238
First focusing on what the Qualifications Clauses alone reveal,
Thomas decides they merely set the floor for membership, not the ceil-
ing, particularly because the Framers neglected to include an exclusivity
provision.239 Thomas states that the Framers settled on these require-
ments only to ensure against one state electing "immature, disloyal, or
unknowledgeable representatives to Congress ' 240 to the detriment of cit-
izens in other states who are governed by all representatives sent to
Washington. 241  Responding to the majority's claim that the Framers
desired uniformity in qualifications, Thomas notes that even under the
Clauses, qualifications originally lacked uniformity because state law
originally determined citizenship, resulting in members of Congress
with differing standards of citizenship.242 Thomas also cites to Thomas
234. Id. at 1885.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1885-89. Tackling the majority's suggestion that the principle of expressio unis est
expressio alterius precludes any additional qualifications, Thomas posits that this maxim, if true
here, only precludes any additional nationwide qualifications. Id. at 1886.
240. Id.
241. Id. Of course, maturity, loyalty, and wisdom could all be undercut should a state impose
qualifications that representatives be mentally unfit, in favor of overthrowing the government, or
uneducated. Thomas apparently foresees this challenge by noting that any such qualifications
would be subject to the constraints of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 1887. But
here Thomas is discussing the Framers' intent. The Framers could not have intended the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to act as safeguards, because they obviously were not written when the
Constitution was drafted. So why would the Framers have intended the Clauses to prevent the
election of immature, disloyal, or unknowledgeable members of Congress, but allowed the states
to add qualifications that could undercut their intent? This is the flaw in Thomas' argument.
242. Id. at 1888. This appears to be a technicality on Thomas' part, akin to suggesting that
because Senator A received 65 percent of the vote, but Senator B only received 52 percent, their
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Jefferson, who, under the guise of the Tenth Amendment, thought the
Clauses were subject to state additions.243
Next Thomas turns to the majority's idea that "democratic princi-
ples" disallow the states or the people from imposing further qualifica-
tions for congressional office.2 " The majority's evidence, Thomas
argues, suggests only that the Framers wanted neither Congress to be
able to impose other requirements, nor the people and the states "to be
constrained by too many qualifications at the national level. 245
Thomas disputes the majority's reading of Powell v. McCormack246
as holding that the Qualifications Clauses are exclusive, opining that the
issue was whether the House's power to judge qualifications allowed it
to impose others, not whether the Clauses prevented it from doing SO.247
Thomas claims that the Framers only feared congressional self-aggran-
dizement in fixing Congress' qualifications, "[b]ut neither the people of
the States nor the state legislatures would labor under the same conflict
of interest ....24
Furthermore, Thomas suggests that "the right to choose may
include the right to winnow, '249 akin to a pre-Seventeenth Amend-
ment 25° state legislature mandating that an incumbent senator not be
qualifications are different. The Constitution required only that members of Congress be citizens,
as then recognized by their states.
243. Id. at 1888-89; see supra note 216 for a more detailed discussion of this reference.
244. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1889 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas finds fault in the
belief that Amendment 73 is undemocratic, when the people of Arkansas can repeal it as easily as
they enacted it. Id. at 1891. This ignores Justice Kennedy's argument that voters cannot
constitutionally decide now that they cannot vote for a candidate again in the future. See supra
note 199 and accompanying text.
245. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1889 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas suggests that when
Madison argued that " 'the door of [the House] is open to merit of every description' " under the
Qualifications Clauses, Madison was simply asserting that the Constitution did not make the
Clauses overly restrictive, but allowed state additions. Id. at 1891-92 (quoting THE FEDERALIST
No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). The majority calls this
interpretation "implausible." Id. at 1857 n.18.
246. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
247. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1889 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas is correct that this
was the critical question in Powell, but the Powell Court certainly implied that the clauses also
denied Congress the power to impose other qualifications. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 540 n.75, 542.
248. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1890 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas fails to
acknowledge that state legislatures could impose a qualification that members of Congress have
prior service in the state legislature, certainly creating a conflict of interest. See Thorsted v.
Gregoire, 841 F. Supp. 1068, 1078-79 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (suggesting that possibility), aff'd sub
nom. Thorsted v. Munro, No. 94-35222 et seq., 1996 WL 39389 (9th Cir. Jan. 30, 1996).
249. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1892 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Hills, supra note 64,
at 107-09). To Thomas, term limits apparently function as no more than a "blind primary," where
a state's voters exclude all future candidates with certain periods of incumbency, and include all
others, without knowing who fits into either category.
250. Prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, which provided for direct election of senators,
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returned on expiration of his term.251 Moreover, Thomas argues, the
fact that the people enacted Amendment 73 is anomalous to the notion
that it violates "democratic principles," even if the Framers intended to
bar state legislatures from imposing new qualifications.252
Finally, Thomas attacks in five parts the majority's conclusion that
history dictates the exclusivity of the Qualifications Clauses. 3 First, at
the Constitutional Convention, a Committee of Detail draft of what
became the House Qualifications Clause included an exclusivity provi-
sion, while the Senate version did not.254  Because the House provision
was deleted, Thomas argues, "the Committee expected neither list of
qualifications to be exclusive. 255
Second, discussing the majority's assertion that the Framers
attempted to minimize state interference with federal elections through
several constitutional provisions, 256 Thomas posits that while the Fram-
ers may have been wary of state legislatures imposing qualifications,257
senators were chosen by the state legislatures. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1; U.S CONST.
amend. XVII.
251. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1892-93 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The critical difference
is that a state legislature could later choose to revoke its declaration with a majority vote and then
return the Senator, whereas the people of Arkansas would, months in advance, have to mount
another petition drive to place a measure on the ballot rescinding Amendment 73 in order to
reelect their incumbents.
252. Id. at 1893. This argument ignores the fact that more than half the state constitutions in
this country do not permit voters to amend through initiative petitions and require some action by
their state legislatures. Grover G. Norquist, A Republican Perspective, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS,
Aug. 1995, at 47; Jonathan Ferry, Coming to Terms with Term Limits: A Summary of State Term
Limit Laws, Dec. 1994, available on Congressional and State Term Limits Homepage of the
Internet at http://www.termlimits.org/statelaws.shtml. Thus, to Thomas, "democratic principles"
permits people in half the country to impose congressional term limits, but denies it to the other
half. See also U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1856 (majority opinion) (quoting THE FEDERALIST
No. 52, at 326 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The qualifications of the elected,
being less carefully and properly defined by the State constitutions .... have been very properly
considered and regulated by the convention.")) (emphasis added).
253. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1894-1909 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 1895. This provision required that members of the House of Delegates be citizens
age 25 or older "'and any person possessing these qualifications may be elected except [blank
space].'" Id. (quoting W. MEiGs, THE GROWTH OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, p. 11 (1900)).
255. Id. The majority counters with two points: First, that the Committee's views do not
indicate how the convention viewed the eventual provision; and second, that the clause was likely
deleted as superfluous because of the expressio unis est expressio alterius maxim. Id. at 1860
n.27 (majority opinion). With regard to the Senate provision, the majority discounts Thomas'
argument because senators were not to be chosen by popular election. Id.
256. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
257. The majority does not recognize the potential distinction between an act of the people of a
state and their legislature. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1858 n.19. "We are aware of no case
that would even suggest that the validity of a state law under the Federal Constitution would
depend at all on whether the state law was passed by the state legislature or by the people . d..." I.
Assuming Amendment 73 were to be deemed an election law as opposed to a qualification,
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they may have embraced the concept of letting the people do so."'
Although the Constitution provides that the federal government pay
members of Congress, 25 9 Thomas argues that this was merely to prevent
a form of recall that would have allowed the states to diminish compen-
sation as punishment, which "would be inconsistent with the notion that
Congress was a national legislature once it assembled. '260 Thomas also
dismisses the majority's argument that the Framers intended to supplant
there appears to be an issue to be considered. The Elections Clause reads that regulations shall be
made in each state "by the Legislature thereof", U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. I (emphasis added).
Of course, the people enacted Amendment 73 through initiative. Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 351. The
author has not previously seen this admittedly strict textual argument advanced. In its Supreme
Court brief, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. claimed that "The phrase 'by the Legislature thereof' has long
been construed to include initiatives, constitutional provisions, and other state methods of making
laws." Brief for Petitioners U.S. Term Limits, Inc., et al., at 9 n.6, US. Term Limits (Nos. 93-
1456 and 93-128) (citing Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 372 (1932) and Ohio ex rel. Davis v.
Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569-70 (1916)).
These cases do not completely support U.S. Term Limits, Inc.'s proposition; however, they
do complicate the author's textual argument set forth above. Smiley concerned whether the word
"Legislature" in Article I, § 4 included executive approval for state legislative acts. 285 U.S. at
365. The Minnesota legislature passed a congressional redistricting act that the governor vetoed.
Id. at 361. The Court first held that the term "Legislature" was intended to mean that body in its
lawmaking function. Id. at 365-66. Second, the Court held that because the executive veto was
generally understood to be part of a state's lawmaking process at the time the U.S. Constitution
was adopted (although used by only a handful of states) and was required by the state's
constitution, executive approval was required for the redistricting legislation. Thus, the term
"Legislature" included executive approval. Id. at 368-73. Yet Smiley is distinguishable on two
points: 1) Amendment 73 is a state constitutional amendment, not a law enacted by a legislature in
its lawmaking function; and 2) Unlike the executive veto, the pure initiative process was not
available to citizens in any state at the time the U.S. Constitution was adopted. In the time
surrounding ratification of the U.S. Constitution, no state allowed its citizens to directly amend
their constitution, although Georgia from 1777 to 1789 allowed the people to petition the
assembly to call a constitutional convention. See THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed., Ben P. Poore,
ed., 1878) (collecting these state constitutions).
Hildebrant concerned whether a referendum rejecting an Ohio redistricting law was
constitutional under the Elections Clause as not being an act by the Legislature. 241 U.S. at 569.
The Court upheld the rejection by referendum because a federal statute authorized the states to
redistrict "by the laws thereof," id. at 568, and because the state constitution rested legislative
power in the people by referendum. Id. at 567-68. Hildebrant is distinguishable because: 1)
Congress has passed no law authorizing states to enact term or ballot access limitations; and 2)
Amendment 73 is not the product of a lawmaking power. See Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 355:
The lawmaking power given to the people to propose and adopt laws by initiative
petition was intended to supplement existing legislative authority .... That power
... is not involved in the case before us. Here, we are concerned with an initiative
petition to amend the Arkansas Constitution, which is a separate matter altogether.
258. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1896 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
259. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
260. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1896 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas' prior arguments
would suggest he believes that the recall would be a reserved power possessed by the states,
because the Constitution does not expressly deny it to them. See supra notes 216-23 and
accompanying text. The original Virginia Plan included a recall provision with the House rotation
provision, but it was also deleted. I id. at 143; 5 id. at 137.
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state authority to legislate with regard to members of Congress by fixing
voter qualifications, 261 resting authority in each house to judge its mem-
bers' qualifications, 262 and permitting Congress to "make or alter" the
states' congressional election laws under the Elections Clause.263
Third, Thomas picks two fights with the majority's opinion on the
ratification debates. First, he discards the majority's seemingly compel-
ling argument that the absence of suggestion during the debates that
states could impose rotation requirements demonstrates a general under-
standing that the Constitution denied it to them, noting that historical
records are incomplete. 2" Second, acknowledging Madison's statement
that but for the Qualifications Clauses, service in the House was open to
all,265 Thomas still argues he cannot infer that Madison meant that states
were denied the power to go further.266
Fourth, Thomas describes at great length qualifications for Con-
gress that states passed shortly after ratification of the Constitution,
including Virginia's property requirement and House district residency
requirements of five states. 267 This suggests to Thomas that America
was in disagreement over state power to impose requirements for con-
gressional office, and therefore history does not support the majority's
261. Thomas argues that the Framers were merely stating that "Representatives from each state
are to be chosen by the State's voters .. " US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1896-97 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
262. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 5, cl. 1. Thomas first suggests that the qualifications to be judged
under this section refer only to those in the Qualifications Clauses, not any subsequent state
requirements. Alternatively, he argues that because Congress would have to look to state law to
judge the "Elections and Returns" of its members under Article I, § 5, it could also look to state
law to judge its members qualifications. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1897-98 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
263. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. Thomas makes the bizarre argument that although Congress
may not impose qualifications on itself, the states may, and Congress' "make or alter" power
extends only towards nullifying state qualifications, not imposing its own. U.S. Term Limits, 115
S. Ct. at 1898-1900.
264. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1900-01 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
265. See supra note 140.
266. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1901-03 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 1903-08. The majority acknowledged Virginia's property requirement, see supra
note 163, but dismissed the district residency requirements as perhaps a "necessary analog to state
residency requirements." Id. at 1866 n.41 (majority opinion); see supra note 185. Additionally,
the majority thought that the limited number of congressional qualifications effected by states, in
light of the "array" of qualifications for the state legislatures, evidenced the states' belief that they
did not have the power to set qualifications. Id.
Of course, the House in 1807 decided not to ruffle Maryland's feathers by avoiding declaring
that state's district residency law invalid and instead seating William McCreery without comment.
See supra notes 136, 162. It may well be that Congress did not challenge these laws for fear of
upsetting the states so early on under the new constitution. Thomas himself suggests this
explanation, noting that some in Virginia feared such a confrontation were Madison to run for
Congress outside of his district. U.S. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1904 n.32 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 378-79 (R. Rutland & C. Hobson eds., 1977)).
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claim. 2 6 8
Finally, Thomas agrees with the majority that congressional prac-
tice in qualifications conflicts has lacked uniformity.2 69 But whereas the
majority interprets this as an absence of general understanding that states
may impose qualifications, Thomas views it as an absence of under-
standing that they may not,270 once again raising the question of who
carries the burden of proof.
3. THE ULTIMATE SAVIOR OF AMENDMENT 73
Concluding that he has sufficiently dismantled the majority's argu-
ments, Thomas turns to the specific provision at issue: Amendment 73's
ballot access limitation. 271 Thomas accepts the measure on its face, con-
cluding that because Amendment 73 does not bar anyone from serving
in Congress, it cannot amount to a qualification.2 72
Nonetheless, Thomas addresses the majority's claim that because
Amendment 73 restricts affected incumbents to write-in candidacies, it
would be a qualification in practice. First, Thomas assumes that popular
congressional incumbents may be reelected by write-in votes.273 The
majority, by dismissing this possibility, "never adequately explains how
it can take this position and still reach its conclusion. '274 Second, he
disputes the majority's decision that Amendment 73's congressional bal-
lot access provision was intended to work as a pure term limitation.275
Instead, Thomas adopts the petitioners' claim that Amendment 73 was
enacted merely to "level the playing field" on which incumbents and
268. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1903-08 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Conceding some states
had term limits for state officers, Thomas argues that the states did not attempt to impose them
upon their members of Congress because rotation was then disfavored as a policy. Id. at 1906.
269. Id. at 1908.
270. Id. at 1908-09. Thomas highlights the 1807 McCreery episode, noting that the House
rejected resolutions that would have expressly signaled that it thought Maryland's district
residency requirement was void, id. at 1908 (citing 17 ANNALs OF CONG. 1231, 1237 (1807)), as
evidencing Congress' division on state authority to impose additional qualifications. Id. at 1909.
271. Id. Thomas pronounces the majority's decision "radical," not only because it prohibits
the states from imposing congressional term limits, but because it necessarily invalidates various
state laws restricting mental incompetents, prisoners, those convicted of vote fraud, and those
ineligible to vote from running for Congress. Id. Lower courts, however, have struck down such
laws in the past as violative of the Qualifications Clauses. See, e.g., Danielson v. Fitzsimmons, 44
N.W.2d 484 (Minn. 1950) (invalidating a law barring felons from running for Congress).
272. US. Term Limits, 115 S. Ct. at 1909 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
273. Id. at 1910 (noting most write-in campaigns are run by unpopular candidates, but attempts
by "well-known and well-funded" candidates fare better).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1911. Thomas attacks the majority for citing the Hill plurality's interpretation that
Amendment 73 was intended as a qualification. He states that intent in such a case is irrelevant,
and further notes that determining the true legislative intent would be nearly impossible when the
"legislative body" "consists of 825,162 Arkansas voters." Id.
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challengers wage congressional campaigns.276 Amazingly, Thomas
argues (perhaps sarcastically) that if Amendment 73's ballot access pro-
vision is unconstitutional, then so is the present political system that
allows the uneven playing field.2 77
In conclusion, Thomas argues that Amendment 73 should be ana-
lyzed under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as are other laws
"that allegedly have the purpose and effect of handicapping a particular
class of candidates."'278  To do otherwise, he suggests, would lead to
viable suits challenging campaign finance laws and redistricting in favor
of incumbents as placing candidates under "significant disadvantages,"
similar to those imposed by Amendment 73.279
V. COMMENTS
A. The Strength and Vitality of U.S. Term Limits
The clashing perspectives borne out in U.S. Term Limits indicate
the deep line of demarcation for future federalism and political reform
cases, as the state and federal governments see their responsibilities and
the electorate's expectations evolve. The next appointment to the Court
will have great impact the near-term resolution of these differences.
As for the evaluations of Amendment 73 specifically, Justice Ste-
vens' opinion appears to be the better reasoned approach. Burdens on
congressional incumbents, be they pure term limitations or denials of
ballot access, would indeed work a profound change in the structure of
American representative democracy. Although public support for lim-
ited terms at all levels of government is strong, one must question if the
public has embraced it as a sound reform after sufficient reflection-as
it should with such a monumentus alteration of our constitutional
arrangement--or if we are instead witnessing a knee-jerk reaction to the
well founded anger with Congress' recent failures to perform as we
expect from our national legislative body.
Earlier this century, Justice Louis Brandeis opined, that "[s]ince
276. Id. Thomas describes the benefits incumbents have in campaigns, from franking
privileges to campaign financing advantages, id. at 1911-12, all of which "the voters of Arkansas
evidently believe" significantly contribute to a nearly 90% reelection rate for incumbents. Id. at
1912 (citing Lloyd N. Cutler, Now is the Time for All Good Men. . ., 30 WM. & MARY L. REv.
387, 395 (1989)). The majority finds this argument "wholly unpersuasive," and says it is
"obvious" that the purpose of Amendment 73 was to limit congressional terms. Id. at 1871. One
might ask if Arkansans sought merely to "level the playing field," and were not attempting to
evade the Qualifications Clauses, why they strictly limited the terms of state officials, instead of
passing identical "ballot access limits" for those incumbents as well.
277. Id. at 1913 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
278. Id.
279. Id.
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government is not an exact science, prevailing public opinion concern-
ing the evils and the remedy is among the important facts deserving
consideration; particularly, when the public conviction is both deep-
seated and widespread and has been reached after deliberation. '" 280
Right or wrong, U.S. Term Limits affords the people of the United States
the opportunity to consider anew the necessity of limiting congressional
terms. Those favoring the idea behind Amendment 73 have not given
up their attempts to impose some form of term limitation without resort-
ing to the difficult constitutional amendment process. 28' But should an
amendment be proposed, one hopes Congress will present it to the peo-
ple in state ratification conventions, rather than to the legislatures, so
that those voting will reflect on the importance of what they are consid-
ering, and that should they ratify, they will be rejecting the Framers'
reasoned wisdom in rejecting term limits two centuries ago.
U.S. Term Limits is a watershed case not only because it invalidates
a popular grass-roots reform effort, but because it also calls upon the
citizenry to search deeply for what it seeks and why.
B. Constitutional, Political, and Practical Implications of U.S. Term
Limits on the Term Limits Movement
Although the respondents in U.S. Term Limits originally had chal-
lenged the state legislative term limits imposed by Amendment 73 in the.
courts below,2 82 the only issue before the Court was the constitutionality
of the amendment's congressional ballot access limits. U.S. Term Limits
does nothing on its face to affect Amendment 73's state legislative pro-
visions, nor similar ones in twenty other states.283 Here the states are
free to, in the words of Justice Brandeis, "serve as a laboratory; and try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country. 5
284
It is too early to determine how term limitations will impact state
280. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 357 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
281. To cite two examples, Senator Hank Brown of Colorado suggests that state laws defining
state residency be changed so that anyone out of the state for more than six months a year for
twelve consecutive years would not satisfy Article I's state residency requirement, which would
facially exclude congressional incumbents who spend most of their time in Washington, D.C.
Karen Hosler, Backers of Term Limits Vow to Seek Amendment, BALTIMORE SUN, May 23, 1995,
at 1 IA. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. plans to try to require candidates to include their positions on term
limits on the ballot next to their names, then encourage voters to reject those opposed to limits. A
similar effort prior to the 17th Amendment helped lead to the popular election of Senators.
Michael Griffin, Court Rejects U.S. Term Limits; Backers Plan New Strategies to Restrict
Incumbents, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENrINEL, May 23, 1994, at IA.
282. Hill, 872 S.W.2d at 352, 359,
283. Term Limit Foes, supra note 199; see also supra note 199, noting potential First and
Fourteenth Amendment concerns.
284. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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government, since the first measures were passed only a few years
ago.2 85 How these limits work, together with an expected high turnover
in Congress this November,28 6 could profoundly impact whether the
drive to amend the Constitution to limit congressional terms succeeds or
fails. Or perhaps public pressure on congressional and state legislative
candidates to vote for a constitutional amendment or petition for a con-
stitutional convention, respectively, may result in limited federal terms
before their impact on the state legislatures can be fully assessed. Lim-
ited terms in modem government are indeed an experiment and their
long-term ramifications remain unknown.28 7
Anything but a brief reference to the potential implications of con-
gressional term limits is beyond the scope of this Note; these have been
extensively considered elsewhere. Some of those suggested include an
undermining of Congress' independence, a corresponding increased def-
erence to the executive branch, interest groups, and congressional
staff,288 and the creation of a Congress of perpetual first-term lame
ducks.28 9 The impact of such measures could reach beyond the Con-
gress itself. One commentator has suggested that term limits will lead to
285. For example, California voters imposed term limits on their legislature in 1990. See CAL.
CONST. art. IV, § 2(a). Of the first 27 new legislators elected after term limits were imposed,
some acted just as their predecessors had, contacting lobbyists and beginning fundraising efforts
within weeks. Jerry Gillam, Term Limits Put Assembly 27 on Bipartisan Path, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
15, 1993, at Al. A recent examination of the California Legislature found some improvement, but
concluded "the initial results have not been encouraging," as legislative business has slowed and
distracting special elections abound. Dan Walters, Term Limits at Halfway Point, SAcRM~ENrro
BEE, May 28, 1995, at A3. See also The Abiding Importance Of Term-Limits Ruling, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, May 24, 1995, at A22 (describing California legislators as "seat-warmers
climbing over each other" to run for the other legislative house or to move to a "cushy statewide
office"). But see John C. Armor, "Foreshadowing" Effects of Term Limits: California 's Example
for Congress, Dec. 18, 1995, available on Congressional and State Term Limits Homepage of the
Internet at http://www.termlimits.org/calexample.shtml (praising the overall impact term limits
have had on the California Legislature).
286. As of March 6, 1996, 41 members of the House and 13 senators have announced their
retirements, a figure unmatched this century in the Senate. See Robert Green, Rep. Enid
Waldholtz to Leave Congress to Clear Name, Reuters North American Wire, March 5, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Top News Library, 2week file; Brigid Schulte, Will the Last Person Leaving
Congress ... Please Turn out the Lights, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 18 1995, at Cl.
287. For example, the 22nd Amendment of the Constitution, limiting presidents to two terms,
arguably has been inconsequential. The only two Presidents who have served two full terms since
it was ratified, Dwight Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan, both were of increased age at the end of
their administrations and unlikely to seek a third term. The amendment's only apparent effect was
a decrease in their influence with Congress near the end of their second terms. SuNDQUIST, supra
note 47, at 175-76.
288. See, e.g., Corwin, supra note 73, at 600-03; Willie L. Brown, Jr., Legislative Term Limits:
Altering the Balance of Power, 7 J. L. & POL. 747, 751-52 (1991).
289. Corwin, supra note 73, at 601-02; Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 GEo.
L.J. 477, 481-83 (1992).
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minority vote dilution.290
There are also numerous valid arguments in support of limited con-
gressional terms.2 9' Agreement is widespread that Congress has often
neglected its responsibility in recent years. It might rightly be sug-
gested, however, that the arguments for or against limiting congressional
terms pale in comparison to one overall observation: Congress has gone
astray precisely because the electorate has allowed it to. The power to
effect change lies now, as it always has, with the people and their bal-
lots. In the final analysis, if Congress has failed America, the ultimate
fault lies at the feet of the voters. Imposing term limitations on its mem-
bership is no more likely to solve these problems than would denying
suffrage to those who elected its members in the first place.
LINCOLN J. CONNOLLY
290. Anthony E. Gay, Comment, Congressional Term Limits: Good Government or Minority
Vote Dilution?, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 2311 (1993).
291. See generally COYNE & FUND, supra note 17; WILL, supra note 44.
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